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THE SUPREME COURT AND EQUALITY:
LEGISLATIVE CLASSIFICATIONS,
DESEGREGATION, AND
REVERSE DISCRIMINATION*
Robert G. Dixon, Jr. t
Of the three great recurring themes in Western legal and
political philosophy-liberty, justice, equality-the equality concept
has always been the most complex and the least productive of
cogent comment. Men are obviously unequal in talent and charac-
ter, conditions and opportunities are infinitely varied, and all
societies seem naturally to develop into a structure of position and
preferment. The assembling of adequate governmental power to
institute and maintain a regime of complete egalitarianism would
pose a threat to liberty. Such considerations prompted Justice
Holmes' characterization of equality as "an ignoble aspiration" and
the idealization of envy. Ignoble though it may be in some of its
manifestations, most would agree that the passion for equality is
one of the driving forces of our times. Liberty and equality are
functionally related, in that a certain modicum of equality is a
pre-condition of a free society. Yet liberty and equality are quite
different concepts. Equality is the more elusive value, with a var-
ied background in natural law, Christian theology, and democratic
theory. The American tradition of equality rests on notions of the
equality of all men before the law. In addition, the American equal-
ity ethic, since the Jacksonian era, has included a notion that gov-
ernment ought to protect the disadvantaged, curb special privi-
leges, and check the overly successful competitor so as to prevent
monopoly.
* Copyright 0 1977, Robert G. Dixon, Jr.
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THE SUPREME COURT AND EQUALITY
I
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE: BIRTH AND BARREN YOUTH
The American idea of equality was first codified-though not
clarified-through adoption of the fourteenth amendment, with its
"equal protection of the laws" clause.' The ultimate question posed
by the equal protection clause is whether there is a constitutional
mandate to actively promote egalitarianism. The answer to that
question has been a long time in coming, mainly because of a lack
of interest in equal protection analysis prior to 1960.2
The birth of the clause was not an immaculate conception.
The Reconstruction Congress sat as a constitutional convention to
formally establish the new status of blacks as free persons, citizens,
and equal partners in the nation's endeavors. 3 But it is apparent
that some members of Congress did not know what they were
talking about, and that, in the end, many did not know what they
were voting for.4 For example, on such an obvious question as
nondiscriminatory access to public services and benefits, the mem-
bers sensed no inconsistency between the new constitutional
amendments and the continued operation of a segregated school
system in the District of Columbia.5 Nor did they make any clear
'See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). In this period the equal
protection clause was construed to be "so clearly" a provision for the black race that a
"strong case" was required for its application to any other.
2 For a discussion of development in the law of equal protection before the 1960's, see
R. HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY (1960) (554 decisions reviewed). Harris found that
426, or 76.9% of the opinions, dealt with legislation affecting economic interests (255 with
regulation, 171 with taxation). Id. at 59. Only 78, or 14.2%, dealt with racial discrimination
(state laws allegedly imposing it or congressional laws to eliminate it). Id. In many of the
economic interest cases, the equal protection issue was subsidiary to due process, and the
bulk of the cases did "little more than display the Court's patience in dealing with trivia."
Id. at 60. In those economic interest cases involving classification of property for state tax
purposes, equal protection was a more separable issue, but often here too "the majestic
grandeur ofjudicial review enshroud[ed] the insignificant." Id.
I See generally R. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 24-56; J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT (1971) (originally published in 1909); J.
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1951); Graham,
The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950 Wis. L. REv. 479, 610;
TENBROEK, Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States--Consummation to Aboli-
tion and Key to the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 CALIF. L. REV. 171 (1951).
4 For a detailed collation of the relevant material in the Congressional Globe and
committee reports, see VIRGINIA COMMISSION ON CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE
RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS' DEBATES (A. Avins ed.) (1967) [hereinafter cited as AvNS].
See also H. FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1908); B. KENDRICK,
THE JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION (1914).
5 See R. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 56; Kelly, The Congressional Controversy over School
Segregation, 1867-1875, 64 AM. HIST. REV. 537 (1959).
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legislative history6 concerning the degree of state involvement
required-if any-before the equal protection clause would reach
particular acts of private discrimination.
While the Department of Justice took a broad view in its initial
enforcement of the civil rights laws enacted to implement the
amendment,7 a more narrow interpretation of the amendment pre-
vailed in the Supreme Court. In its 1880 decision in Strauder v. West
Virginia,8 the Court was steadfast in prohibiting exclusion of blacks
from jury selection. But three years later it could find no basis in
the fourteenth amendment for a congressional statute seeking to
ban racially discriminatory practices in restaurants, theaters, or
other places of "public accommodation. 9 And the firm stand in
Strauder against racial discrimination was significantly undercut in
1896, when the Court upheld state-imposed racial segregation in
transportation.10 On other fronts, the Supreme Court did surpris-
ingly little with the equal protection clause. For example, in the
area of sex discrimination, the Court indicated almost a 'josephic"
aversion to women 1' in its early cases, rejecting challenges to dis-
crimination in respect to law practice, 1 2 suffrage,' 3 and tending
bar.'
4
6 See Frank & Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50
COLum. L. REv. 131 (1950). Frank and Munro attempted to distill the meaning of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment by combining the understandings at
passage by Congress in 1866, at ratification in 1868, and at the end of the Reconstruction
decade when the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was passed. However, they succeeded only in
underscoring the confusion among the fourteenth amendments architects as to the mean-
ing of equal protection. Although there was general agreement that "all men without re-
gard to race or color" should have the same rights with respect to property, legal proce-
dure, entry into business, and certain other interests, there was "substantial divergence"
over whether this also required an end to segregation in the schools. For other interpreta-
tions of the "original meaning" of the fourteenth amendment (more noted for their vol-
ume than agreement), see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 590-608 (1964) (dissenting opin-
ion, Harlan, J.). See also AviNs, supra note 4, at 168 (listing more than 20 "original understand-
ing" articles by Avins); Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights?
The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949); Van Alstyne, The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, The "Right" to Vote, and the Understanding of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, 1965 SuP. CT.
REv. 33.
1 H. CUMMINGS & C. MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUsTICE 230-48 (1937).
8 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
9 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). It was not until 1964, after the passage of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1971a-1975d, 2000a to
2000h-6 (1970), that a national public accommodation law was upheld by the courts. See
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
10 See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
1 R. HARRIS, supra note 2, at 73.
12 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
13 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
14 Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948), disapproved in Craig v. Boren, 97 S. CL 451,
463 n.23 (1976).
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The Court was likewise reluctant to use the equal protection
clause as a general curb on state legislative power. Theoretically,
the equal protection clause could have been invoked whenever a
legislative classification did not precisely fit the purposes of the
statute.' 5 But the Court, perhaps recognizing the spasmodic nature
of all large legislative assemblies and the inherent imperfection in
their work products,' 6 was disposed to invalidate inexactly phrased
legislation on equal protection grounds only if no conceivable set of
circumstances could be imagined to justify the legislation.'" Excep-
tions to this minimum rationality approach were rare.'8 Indeed,
the courts turned not to the equal protection clause, but to the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, to nourish and pro-
tect various liberties deemed "fundamental."' 9
Until the post-World War II era, then, the equal protection
clause functioned as "the usual last resort of constitutional ar-
guments."2 By 1950, however, concern about America's racial
problems had begun to crystallize.2' Civil Rights groups conducted
extensive litigation2 2 (most notably, Brown v. Board of Education in
1954),23 aimed at "solving" America's race problem through broad
application of the fourteenth amendment, particularly the equal
1- Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341, 347-48
(1949).16 See Posner, The De Funis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment of Racial
Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 26-31 (because the political process is based on com-
promise and accommodation of private interests, it is a mistake to demand that the result-
ing legislation be rationally related to some stated social purpose). The political science
literature on the "irrational," i.e., illogical, nature of the legislative process is voluminous.
See generally D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS (1951); J. TURNER, PARTY AND
CONSTITUENCY: PRESSURES ON CONGRESS (1952); J. WAHLKE, H. EULAU, W. BUCHANAN & L.
FERGUSON, THE LEGISLATIVE SYSTEM: EXPLORATIONS IN LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR (1962).
'See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
's See R. HARRIS, supra note 2, ch. 3.
19 After Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court for decades engaged in
"Lochnerizing" against social legislation, and since Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46
(1947), the Court has "incorporated" most of the fundamental aspects of the Bill of Rights
into the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. On the former development, see
Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L.J. 74 (1963); Strong,
The Economic Philosophy of Lochner: Emergency, Embrasure, and Emasculation, 15 ARIz. L. REV.
419 (1973). See generally Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A
Prolegomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43.
20 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927) (Holmes, J.).
21 The gravity of the issues had been certified by our traditional device for highlight-
ing problems-a Presidential study. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, To SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947).
12 See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (restrictive covenant); Sipuel v. Board of
Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (segregation in graduate education); Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649 (1944) (white primary).
23 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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protection clause. It was a period of ferment and hope, continuing
into the early 1960's at least, and a spirit of optimism pervaded the
literature of the times.2 4 By the mid-sixties, however, it was becom-
ing apparent that all was not well with the desegregation decision
of 1954. There had been Little Rock, the golf course confrontation
of Governor Faubus and President Eisenhower, the Southern Man-
ifesto, massive resistance in Virginia, and precious little forward
movement from the Supreme Court.25
In the late sixties, the Supreme Court's new-found doctrinal
creativity, 26 spreading also into fields not strictly race-related, pro-
duced a new two-tiered equal protection theory, with "strict
scrutiny" or "substantive equal protection ' 27 being applied to legis-
lative classifications affecting "suspect classes" or "fundamental
rights." This new test was used to strike down legislative classifica-
tions whenever favored groups or rights were threatened. A still
newer version allows the Court to nullify classifications which are
not reasonably precise in matching necessary means to legitimate
ends.28 Both of these equal protection doctrines can yield at least as
much judicial power as the old substantive due process, and there-
fore merit careful analysis.
To survey the current scene is not to be reassured. Despite vast
forward movement, both doctrinally and empirically, 29 we seem to
have barely kept pace with the growth of equality-related problems
and expectations. To be sure, the power of the federal government
and the courts to influence race relations has been greatly en-
hanced.3 0 Yet, the easy targets are gone. The egregious, highly
24 See R. HARRIS, supra note 2. For the success story in transportation, see Dixon, Civil
Rights in Air Transportation and Government Initiative, 49 VA. L. REv. 205 (1963); Dixon, Civil
Rights in Transportation and the ICC, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 198 (1962).25 See Griffin v. County Sch. Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (voided public school closing
while white children had public funds to attend private schools); Watson v. Memphis, 373
U.S. 526 (1963) (delay in recreation desegregation criticized); Goss v. Board of Educ., 373
U.S. 683 (1963) (minority-to-majority transfer plan voided). Indeed, the modern era of
major integration orders as a temporary remedy to achieve the goal of a "unitary, nonra-
cial system," dates only from Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
26 The Reapportionment Revolution, also based on the equal protection clause, came
concurrently. Although the reapportionment issue involves doctrinal creativity, it does not
fit the equal protection clause generically and has been the cause of much conceptual
confusion.27 See notes 42-67 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 155-204 and accompanying text infra.
" See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STATUS OF NEGROES IN THE
UNITED STATES (1970); WASHINGTON CENTER FOR METROPOLITAN STUDIES, METROPOLITAN
BULLETIN: AGENDA FOR THE 70's (Aug. 1972) (reporting sharp rise in economic power of
black families in the District of Columbia). See also S. MASTERS, BLACK-WHITE INCOME
DIFFERENTIALS (1975).
30 There is currently a four-faceted solution to the power problem: (1) expansion of
[Vol. 62:494
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visible acts of segregation and discrimination have been replaced
by more subtle problems of race relations. We now face questions
that it would have been unthinkable to raise a few decades ago.
Does the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
prohibit government from offering any benefits where access
to those benefits may vary with the financial circumstance of the
recipient?31 Or, does the equal protection clause require adoption
of a principle of ethnic proportionality for significant parts of our
social and economic system? The picture has changed rapidly, and
we have moved from battles to promote seemingly clear causes
supported by a broad moral consensus of the community, to battles
over what the cause should be. The following discussion focuses on
two equal protection issues likely to be at the forefront of future
litigation: namely, the use of the equal protection clause to nullify
legislation on a fairly broad scale, and the continuing development
of equal protection theory in the volatile areas of desegregation
and "reverse" discrimination.
II
EQUAL PROTECTION AND LEGISLATIVE CHOICES
In its more extreme manifestations, the "new substantive equal
protection" doctrine threatens to make the concept of legislation
itself unconstitutional. The underlying problem in using the equal
protection clause as an instrument for legislative review is that
virtually all legislation classifies. One of the first rules a child en-
counters is that he should start kindergarten at age five and first
grade at age six.32 There are rules governing the age at which a
budding politician may bud,33 and when even healthy people must
retire.34 Must each of the classifications that follow us through
the "state action" concept to bring "private" activities within the control of the fourteenth
amendment; (2) expansion of federal power under the commerce clause to reach much
interstate business; (3) the development of a unique "remedial" theory of federal power;
and (4) the revival and expansion of the thirteenth amendment, at least with respect to
blacks.
3' An exhaustive treatment of this question would involve discussion of the thirteenth
amendment and the Court's recent reliance upon it in the area of racial discrimination in
employment and education. This Article focuses on the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
32 Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (N.D. Me. 1975) (discussed at notes 138-42
and accompanying text infra).
33 Wurtzel v. Falcey, 69 N.J. 401, 354 A.2d 617 (1976) (discussed at note 141 infra).
14 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974), rev'd,
96 S. CL 2562 (1976) (discussed at notes 147-50 and accompanying text infra).
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life-whether based on age or other special status35 -be precisely
tailored to accomplish the legislative purpose behind it, so that it
sweeps in only those who should be covered, no more and no less?
To be sure, one of our basic equality values is that equals should be
treated alike, and there is a large body of literature on the more
refined version of that concept known as distributive justice. 36 But
legislatures are very human and very imperfect. The equal protec-
tion clause, if applied with any stringency at all, opens the door to
an endless sequence of challenges to governmental actions which
do not draw classifications that exactly fit legislative purposes (as-
suming that there even is a clear policy purpose). Inexact tailoring
produces either the vice of under-inclusion, as when we confine
anti-discrimination legislation to sellers of multiple-unit housing,37
or over-inclusion, as when we used Japanese ancestry as a basis for
incarcerating a large number of American citizens during World
War 11.38
Although sometimes insisting on consistency and clarity in the
legislative product, the Court, taking to heart Emerson's admoni-
tion that consistency is the hobgoblin of petty minds, has followed
no straight line in enforcing the equal protection clause. The older
"minimum rationality" test, still employed by the Court in some
cases,39 involves a "quick peek" approach. As eloquently formu-
35 Other classifications include differential tax rates keyed to income level and eased by
ownership of depreciable assets; length of work period needed to qualify for unemploy-
ment compensation, retirement awards, or disability awards; difference in penal confine-
ment periods on the basis of offense classification; exemptions from various business or
labor relations regulations depending on size and nature of the enterprise; and so on
through an almost infinite list.
'6 See generally G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE: A THEORY OF SOCIAL STRATIFICATION
(1966); J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); N. RESCHER, DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE (1966);
W. RUNCIMAN, RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (1966); Murphy, Distributive Jus-
tice, Modern Significance, 17 AM. J. JuRis. 153 (1972); Reisman, Notes on Meritocracy, 96
DAEDALUS 897 (1967).
" See Lee v. O'Hara, 20 Cal. Rptr. 617, 370 P.2d 321 (Cal. App. 1962); Colorado
Anti-Discrim. Comm'n v. Case, 151 Colo. 235, 380 P.2d 34 (1962); Massachusetts Comm'n
Against Discrim. v. Colangelo, 344 Mass. 387, 182 N.E.2d 595 (1962); Levitt & Sons, Inc.,
v. Division Against Discrim. in State Dep't of Educ., 31 N.J. 514, 158 A.2d 177 (N.J. Super.
1960); O'Meara v. Washington State Bd. Against Discrim., 58 Wash. 793, 365 P.2d 1
(1961).
38 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
39 In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 96 S. CL 2513 (1976), the Supreme Court again
employed the "mere rationality" test to uphold a city ordinance which excluded all hot dog
vendors from the French Quarter of New Orleans except those who had worked there for
eight years or more. The Court specifically overruled Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957),
the only case in the last half century that invalidated a wholly economic regulation solely
on equal protection grounds, as a "needlessly intrusive judicial infringement on the State's
legislative powers." Id. at 2518. See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S.
[Vol. 62:494
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lated in Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,40 the test requires the
Court to uphold a classification whenever it is possible to imagine
conditions under which that classification would be reasonable. In
the 1960's, the Warren Court developed the idea of substantive
equal protection as a basis for close judicial review of legislation,
particularly in such areas as voting rights, minority opportunity,
and welfare regulation. Under this "strict scrutiny" test, the Court
rejects the tolerant quick peek of the minimum rationality ap-
proach, and becomes more inclined to a conclusive frown. More
recently, the Court has sometimes taken a middle ground requir-
ing that the classification have a "strong rational basis." This ap-
proach, under which the Court applies something of an "un-
friendly quizzical look" to the challenged legislation, leads the
Court into the morass of ends-means review.41 Still another variant
of modern equal protection analysis is a general disdain for legisla-
tion creating "irrebuttable presumptions." A common facet of all of
the newer versions of equal protection-strict scrutiny, irrebuttable
presumption, and strong rational basis-is a distaste for legislative
prohibitions or disabilities which are phrased in broad terms. Such
distaste is, in effect, an aversion for the creaking legislative process
itself; for central to the legislative process are the "unprincipled"
practice of compromise and adjustment, and the elevation of gen-
eral rules over individualized determinations.
A. Strict Scrutiny
The strict scrutiny doctrine,42 which now may be on the
Ct. 2562 (1976) (mere rationality test used to validate mandatory retirement for state
policemen); McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969) (rationality test
used to uphold denial of absentee ballots to local jail inmates awaiting trial); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (general reasonableness standard used to validate classifica-
tions in Sunday Closing Laws); notes 155-204 and accompanying text infra.
40 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
41 Gunther has referred to this development as the old equal protection with a "new
bite." See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term--Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Modelfor a Netger Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 20 (1972).
42 "Strict scrutiny," commonly identified as a late Warren Era construction, has roots in
three earlier developments. Race needed no Warren Court probing to become a "suspect
category." Per se invalidity of racial classifications was the message of Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and after the separate-but-equal period of Plessy v. Fergu-
son, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), per se invalidation was the message of Brown v. Board of Educ.,
347 U.S. 483 (1954). The constitutional suspectness of racial classifications has recently
been brought into question, however, by the preferential admissions cases. See notes
279-343 and accompanying text infra.
Apart from race, two earlier strands merit mention. One derives from Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), almost a "sport" in statistical terms in its own time. It was
a forerunner of the idea that when a fundamental value is at stake (avoidance of being
19771
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62:494
wane,43 has nevertheless been an especially powerful engine of
judicial invalidation of legislation. The doctrine applies to any legis-
lative classification affecting enjoyment of a fundamental right,
such as travel, or to a classification suspect per se, such as one
based on race or alienage. A good example of strict scrutiny in
action is Shapiro v. Thompson,44 a case concerning the once-common
requirement of one-year residency in a state as a precondition for
welfare eligibility. After identifying interstate migration as a fun-
damental right, the Court subjected to strict scrutiny-and re-
jected-the state's purported justifications for the residency re-
quirement as a legitimate approach toward planning the welfare
budget, avoiding double payment, encouraging work by new ar-
rivals, and discouraging immigration solely to obtain welfare ben-
efits. Likewise, in Williams v. Rhodes, the Court strictly scrutinized
the preferential treatment given to established major parties over
newly formed parties in access to Ohio's presidential election
ballot. 45 Over three dissents and a concurrence rejecting the equal
protection basis for the ruling,46 the Court nullified the Ohio rules
on the grounds that they needlessly impaired the fundamental
sterilized as a recidivist), the classifications used to determine who is to be tagged and who
is to escape must exactly identify the characteristics which support the end to be achieved.
The other strand comes from the line of cases "equalizing" the position of funded and
unfunded criminals with respect to availability of such benefits as counsel and trial tran-
scripts necessary to perfect an appeal. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Grif-
fin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). But in truth, as Justice Harlan so perceptively observed
in his still-unanswered dissent, these are basically "fair trial" cases. Indeed, the Court has
refused to carry to their logical conclusion the open-ended equality simplisms of Justice
Black in Griffin v. Illinois (joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Douglas and Clark).
See Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (no right to free counsel for discretionary state
appeals and applications for review in Supreme Court); Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40
(1974) (allowing recoupment of legal expenses furnished by state to subsequently funded
indigent).
"a Certainly Justice Powell's opinion for the Court in San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), seems to signal a spirit of moving deliberately, empirically, and
incrementally, rather than by creative leaps, in judicial review of government programs.
44 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
41 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
46 The lineup of the dissenters in Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), and in
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), is interesting. To the prescient it would have
suggested then that the "strict scrutiny" test would itself receive careful scrutiny when the
trigger was not a suspect category, or when the trigger was an appeal to a fundamental
right other than voter access to the ballot box (not at issue in Williams). Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Stewart and White dissented in Williams, and Justice Harlan placed his con-
currence solely on first amendment grounds. In Shapiro the Chief Justice again dissented,
along with Justices Black and Harlan. But in the same year, in Kramer v. Union Free Sch.
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969), concerning disqualification of nonparents and nonproperty
owners from school district elections, the Chief Justice wrote an uncompromising "strict
scrutiny" opinion and nullified the limitations.
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rights of free speech and voting.47
Put pithily, the strict scrutiny doctrine is this: We, the Justices
of the Supreme Court, feel that some rights are so fundamental,
and some classifications so suspect, that any legislation which uses a
suspect category or which operates to deny a fundamental right
to some and not to others will be nullified unless the government
sustains the burden of showing a compelling state interest in the
classification imposed. The second half of the formula, shifting the
burden of proof to the state, is as important as the first.48 There
are few classifications which can be said to be truly vital-cer-
tainly not a one-year residency requirement for welfare eligi-
bility49 or suffrage.5" Nor is a compelling interest served by a
requirement that one possess property or be a parent as a pre-
condition to voting in a school election. 51 Classifications such as these
have been found unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test.
The Court recently did uphold a one-year residency require-
ment for divorce in Sosna v. Iowa.52 Customarily, however, the
states have not fared well in sustaining the burden of showing a
compelling state interest.53 Thus, the Court's power to assert that
17 The principal beneficiary of the ruling was Governor Wallace of Alabama, whose
American Independent Party had sought a place on the Ohio ballot in the 1968 Presiden-
tial election. 393 U.S. at 26. Another beneficiary of the ruling was the Socialist Labor Party,
which had brought a suit that was a companion case to Williams. Id.
48 There is an intellectual affinity between the fundamental rights branch of equal
protection "strict scrutiny" and the sense of fundamentality which has produced the "pre-
ferred freedoms" gloss on the first amendment, with a corresponding shift of a special
burden of'justification to the state. As I said on another occasion:
It may well be that such subtle shifts in burdens of proof and presumptions in
constitutional cases are a most important aspect of the substantive due process
spirit, even if not at first perceived as such. Little noticed by laymen, because
seemingly mere arcane technicalities, such shifts materially affect outcomes. In this
way the bench asserts, sub silentio but powerfully, its own perception of what is
.. "fundamental" and thus necessarily placed on a pedestal.
Dixon, supra note 19, at 61-62 (footnotes omitted).
49 See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thomp-
son, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
5 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
51 See Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969).
52 419 U.S. 393 (1975). The Court found that the plaintiff would suffer only delay, not
deprivation, and that the state had such legitimate interests as ensuring protection of
spouses and children, avoiding becoming a divorce mill, and avoidance of intermeddling in
matters with primary roots still in another state. Not convinced that Shapiro v. Thompson
could be so easily distinguished, one commentator on Sosna asked whether "the Burger
Court is preparing to reconsider the source of the right to travel." Comment, A Strict
Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129, 1159 (1975).
'3 Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972),
stated: "Some lines must be drawn. To challenge such lines by the 'compelling state interest!
standard is to condemn them all. So far as I am aware, no state law has ever satisfied this
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an interest affected by a classification is fundamental, or that the
policy is keyed to a suspect classification, has normally been tan-
tamount to a power to place certain matters beyond the effective
grasp of the legislature. A racial classification imposing a detriment
on the group affected has been upheld only once in our history; in
Korematsu v. United States,54 the Court upheld the internment of
Japanese-Americans during World War II.
The list of "suspect classifications" includes race, and (oddly
enough) alienage for purposes of welfare eligibility55 or access to
occupations. 56 Sex and illegitimacy are not avowedly suspect clas-
sifications, although several challenges to classification on these two
bases have been successful under a nominally less strict standard of
equal protection review. 57 Professor Barrett concludes that the
Court has begun to treat sex as a suspect classification, at least
where females are disadvantaged (hence, a primary effect of the
equal rights amendment, if adopted, may be to help males).5 8 The
Court has invalidated legislation terminating a father's support
duty at eighteen for female but at twenty-one for male children, 59
legislation creating a preference for males as administrators of
decedents' estates,60 and legislation preventing servicewomen from
claiming their spouses as dependents on the same liberal basis al-
seemingly insurmountable standard, and I doubt one ever will .... " But see American
Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974);
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971) (cases sustaining relatively minor inhibitions such
as petition requirements). See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974) (sustaining
California's disenfranchisement of ex-felons because of § 2 of the fourteenth amendment
concerning "participation in rebellion or other crime").
54 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
55 In regard to the suspect classification concept, once we move beyond the "suspect-
ness" of race as a classifying device, there are no adequate ground rules for determining
additional ones. A test of invidiousness keyed to use of an immutable, involuntary charac-
teristic could be too broad (e.g., age); a test keyed to a history of community discrimination
could be too narrow (e.g., denying protection to men). See Barrett, Judicial Supervision of
Legislative Classifications-A More Modest Role for Equal Protection?, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 89.
'
6 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
Invalidation of alienage as a classification device under an equal protection theory
coincides with an earlier consistent American tradition of perceiving legal rights and duties
in terms of "persons" rather than "citizens." See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
36 (1873). See also A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 33 (1975); Bickel, Citizenship in
the American Constitution, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 369 (1973).
57 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973);
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
58 Barrett, supra note 55, at 90-91. See also Ginsburg, Gender and the Constitution, 44
U. CIN. L. REV. 1 (1975).
59 Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975).
60 Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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lowed for male servicemen. 61 In two instances, however, the Court
has upheld legislation discriminating in favor of women and
against men: a law granting a tax exemption for widows but not
widowers,6 2 and a military policy applying less stringently to fe-
male personnel in linking mandatory discharge to nonpromo-
tion (i.e., the up-or-out policy).63 Similarly, the Court has invali-
dated classifications based on illegitimacy six times, and validated
only one such classification in recent years.64 The Court has never
treated wealth per se as a suspect classification.65
The list of fundamental rights now includes virtually all as-
pects of voting and access to the ballot,66 and certain aspects of
access to the judicial process, such as free transcripts and filing fees
for impecunious defendants6 7 in criminal cases.
B. Limiting the Scope of the Doctrine: The Case of School Financing
When an attempt was made to use the new equal protection to
restructure radically the traditional system of financing public edu-
cation, the Supreme Court finally drew the line in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.68 The challenged financing
system, based on local school district property taxation, necessarily
produced significant interdistrict disparities in per pupil expendi-
ture, due to local differences in taxable wealth. Conceptually, the
61 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
62 Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). See Parson v. Grabert, 344 N.E.2d 317 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1976).
63 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975). But see Califano v. Goldfar, 45 U.S.L.W.
4237 (U.S. Mar. 2, 1977) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security Act provision making
qualification for survivors' benefits more difficult for widowers than for widows).
64 An intestate succession law denying illegitimates the same inheritance rights as
legitimates was upheld in Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). The decisions invalidat-
ing restrictions based on illegitimacy were: Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974)
(Social Security disability benefits); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619
(1973) (state welfare); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (duty of paternal support);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (Workmen's Compensation claim for
death of natural father); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (recovery for wrongful
death of natural mother); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968)
(recovery for wrongful death of illegitimate child). Voiding the resriction in Labine v.
Vincent could have had the effect of diluting the share of legitimate children, a factor not
present in the other cases, except possibly Gomez v. Perez.
65 When wealth affects the availabilty of other fundamental rights, the classification
becomes suspect. See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia.Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (poll
tax affecting rights of indigents to vote held unconstitutional); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of appointed counsel to indigents on appeal held unconstitutional).
But cf. United States v. MacCollom, 96 S. Ct. 2086 (1976) (holding indigent prisoner not
entitled to treat transcript as matter of right in pursuing habeas corpus relief).
66 Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
67 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
68 411 U.S. 1, reh. denied, 411 U.S. 959 (1973).
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litigation was an attack on "intrastate federalism." Logically it
would not be confinable to education, because the existence of local
governments as a third tier of regulation and finance leads to wide
intrastate variations in provision of other important public services
such as police and fire protection, water supply, and sewer service.
A new dimension thus entered in this kind of suit. Nominally seek-
ing to vindicate personal rights against government, insofar as
statewide equality was sought, the suit really asked the Court to
review and restructure the institution of local government itself.69
Doctrinally, the Rodriguez case exemplifies the strict scrutiny facet
of the developing equal protection clause. Jurisprudentially it is far
more. It illustrates the insufficiency of "equal protection" as a deci-
sional guide for institutional restructuring, and the elusive nature
of the underlying equality values.
The Rodriguez litigation was an attempt to reverse an earlier
defeat in federal courts for the principle of compensatory (or at
least equal) educational expenditure.7 0 Stunned by the apparent
breadth of the defeat, various civil rights groups sought ways of
presenting the equalization argument. They developed an appeal-
ing rhetoric and finally succeeded in California in Serrano v.
Priest,7' and in some subsequent cases in other states that eventu-
ally became known colloquially as the "Serrano cases."' 72 The
California Supreme Court said that the conventional local property
tax basis for financing public education "invidiously discriminate[d]
against the poor."73 Apparently endorsing fully the plaintiffs'
theory of the case, the court went on to say:
To allot more educational dollars to the children of one district
than to those of another merely because of the fortuitous pres-
69 Metropolitan desegregation suits seek effectively the same kind of restructuring. See
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), discussed at note 249 and accompanying text
infra.
,0 Burson v. Wilkerson, 397 U.S. 44 (1970) (per curiam); Mclnnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S.
322 (1969) (per curiam). The complaint in Mcnnis v. Ogilvie was murky, but apparently
encompassed both a "one-student one-dollar" analogue of the one-man one-vote idea and a
concern for some compensatory inputs. See Schoettle, The Equal Protection Clause in Public
Education, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1355 (1971).
71 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
12See Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Milliken v. Green,
389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d
187 (1972).
" Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 604
(1971).
The case was remanded for further proceedings because the court relied on facts
judicially noticed or assumed true on demurrer and had technically reversed only a dis-
missal granted under a general demurrer.
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ence of such property is to make the quality of a child's education
dependent upon the location of private commercial and industrial
establishments. Surely, this is to rely on the most irrelevant of
factors as the basis for educational financing.7 4
Under the plaintiffs' theory, the system of local school finance-
with some state supplementation-would have to be operated
under a "fiscal neutrality" principle75 employing a district power-
equalization formula. Some local discretion over tax rates would
remain, but the amount of revenue transferred to poorer dis-
tricts would be determined by the state.
76
The Serrano theory was subjected to significant criticism even
before the Supreme Court rejected an analogous plea in Rodriguez.
The power-equalization formula rests on equating wealth with the
assessed valuation of real estate, presuming sub silentio that
less assessed value exists in districts populated by parents with
low income. Studies in Connecticut and Kansas, however, have
rebutted this assumption.77 Moreover, under the Serrano theory,
74 1d. at 601, 487 P.2d at 1252-53, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 612-13 (emphasis added, footnote
omitted).
Jurisprudentially, Serrano was a mess (see notes 77-87 and accompanying text infra), and
illustrates afresh the danger of advisory opinions, whether of the overt variety or in the
form of pre-judging critical public policy issues in a one-sided fictional setting on demur-
rer. It was left to commentators to expose the mixture of high purpose and speciousness in
the work which undergirded the case. See J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE
WEALTH AND PuIauc EDUCATION (1970) [hereinafter cited as COONS]; Clune, The Supreme
Court's Treatment of Wealth Discriminations Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1975 Sup. CT. REV.
289. [Hereinafter the phrase "Serrano theory" will refer both to the general work of Coons
et al. and the judicial gloss in Serrano itself.]
Particularly in the equality field, where judicial review now acts not merely to negate
governmental action, but to impose "affirmative-duties" and reshape complex programs,
new judicial directions should not be based on special pleading concealed as scholarship,
thin factual records, and abandonment of the presumption of constitutionality. Nor should
the burden of justifying the whole existing order as necessary and part of a "rational plan"
be switched to the state. Another important factor is the control plaintiffs normally exer-
cise over the timing of litigation, including the opportunity for lengthy preparation, for
marshalling specialized and often free talent in the law schools, and for developing novel
but not implausible theories. The larger the issue, the more alert courts should be to the
virtues of incremental change factually founded in our total experience, rather than crea-
tive doctrinal leaps.
5 See CooNs, supra note 74, at 2, 295-433.
7 6 See Brief for The Urban Coalition, The National Committee for the Support of the
Public Schools, as Amicus Curiae at 23-24, 35-41, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d
1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). See also COONS, supra note 74, at 201-42, 395-433.
7USee Ridenour & Ridenour, Serrano v. Priest: Wealth and Kansas School Finance, 20 U.
KAN. L. REV. 213, 225 (1972). Note, A Statistical Analysis of the School Finance Decisions: On
Winning Battles and Losing Wars, 81 YALE L.J. 1303 (1972). To a significant extent, the
urban poor live in districts with relatively high assessed values due to the presence of
industrial and commercial property. A California legislative committee study projected that
an equalization plan would transfer away from San Francisco approximately one-third of
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there is actually a disincentive for rich districts to increase local
taxes, since much of any additional revenue would be diverted to
poorer districts. This disincentive could lead to a decline in local
contribution to educational costs, thus increasing the demand on
state reserves by poorer districts. 78
The critical doctrinal foundations of the California Supreme
Court's constitutional theory in Serrano were the characterizations
of wealth as a suspect classification, and of public education as a
fundamental right. This done, the wealth and expenditure dis-
parities became presumptively unconstitutional unless the state
could show a compelling need for continuing the traditional school
financing system. The Serrano case offers an especially good illus-
tration of the somewhat specious nature of the "strict scrutiny" test.
Strict scrutiny provides a vehicle for shaking up public policy and
imposing affirmative duties on government, under the guise of
constitutional law, without requiring the Court to decide or even
discuss the basic substantive issue, i.e., the meaning of equality in
allocation of resources. Nominally, the government is merely told
that it cannot continue to operate the program at issue in the
customary manner. Nominally, it is not told to "equalize," a step
that the lower federal courts were loath to order in two pre-Serrano
cases. 79 But the matter is not that simple. If the state is not to
abandon the challenged program-and usually abandonment is
unthinkable-it must proceed affirmatively to define equality
its per-pupil funds available for unrestricted use. Carrington, Financing the American Dream:
Equality and School Taxes, 72 CoLuM. L. REV. 1226, 1236 (1973).
In light of such factual difficulties, one may wonder whether the Serrano theory would
have been so appealing to the California Supreme Court had it not, unlike the inter-
mediate appellate court (10 Cal. App. 3d 1110, 1117-18, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345, 350-51, (Ct.
App. 1970)), taken the state's demurrer as an admission of the plaintiffs' "material facts."
This generally acceptable technique of civil procedure may be a highly questionable way to
try a constitutional challenge to complex state programs.
78 Carrington, On Egalitarian Overzeal: A Polemic Against the Local School Property Tax
Cases, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 232, 242-43.
79 The point was well put by one of the Serrano theory strategists:
While logically, it is true, equality and inequality are mutually exclusive and ex-
haust the universe, it nevertheless makes a great deal of practical difference
whether we ask, on the one hand, whether particular treatment is unequal in a
particular respect, or whether, on the other hand, we ask whether particular
treatment is equal in all other respects. We may be able to decide what is
unequal-an inquiry which can easily be narrowed and pinpointed-without hav-
ing the haziest notion as to what is equal. To determine what is equal requires
omniscience with respect to the infinite aspects of any particular distribution of
benefit or burden, plus the ability to measure or weigh each aspect in comparison
to the others-an impossible task, certainly for the judiciary.
Shanks, Educational Financing and Equal Protection: Will the California Supreme Court's Break-
through Become the Law of the Land?, 1 J.L. & EDUc. 73, 86 n.34 (1972).
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under the watchful eye of the court. A court can thus nullify "on
the cheap" as it were, and then participate in defining substantive
equality rights by the backdoor route of remedy. The focus subtly
shifts to the effectiveness of the remedy in introducing change, and
away from the unresolved and perhaps unresolvable question of
the ultimate dimension of the underlying substantive right.
Although not fully articulated in these terms, the Supreme
Court's rejection of the Serrano theory in Rodriguez may have been
induced, at least in part, by a realization that use of strict scrutiny
here could embroil the courts in matters of public administration.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell could find neither an iden-
tifiable "suspect" class nor a "fundamental interest" in public edu-
cation per se. Plaintiffs had asserted a theory of wealth-i.e., dif-
ferential school district taxable wealth-as a suspect category. To
the Court, this amounted to saying that the disadvantaged class
encompassed "every child in every district except the district thai
ha[d] the most assessable wealth and spen[t] the most on
education. ' ' 81 None of the "traditional indicia of suspectness" were
found in such a "large, diverse, and amorphous class." 8 1
In respect to the fundamental interest line of analysis, the
Court did bow to the language of Brown v. Board of Education82 by
referring to education as "perhaps the most important function of
state and local government."83 But this characterization was viewed
as a socio-political assessment, not a statement of constitutional
right:
It is not the province of this Court to create substantive constitu-
tional rights in the name of guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws. Thus the key to discovering whether education is "funda-
mental" is not to be found in comparisons of the relative societal
significance of education as opposed to subsistence or housing.
Nor is it to be found by weighing whether education is as impor-
tant as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in assessing
whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed by the Constitution.8 4
8 411 U.S. at 28. As the Court noted, the plaintiffs in Serrano had in fact proclaimed
that the disadvantaged class encompassed every child in every district except the district
with the most assessable wealth. Id. at 28 n.65.
8 1 Id. at 28.
82 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
83 San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
s4 d. at 33-34. The Rodriguez plaintiffs also tried to develop a derivative theory of
fundamental interests, analogizing education to free speech and voting rights-rights that
cannot be enjoyed without a decent education. This nexus theory, however, has no logical
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Justice Powell also pointed to the "unprecedented upheaval" in
public education that would flow from acceptance of the plaintiffs'
fiscal power-equalization theory, the unpredictable consequences of
such a "massive change in the financing and control of public
education,' 85 and the factual uncertainty as to whether the poorest
families actually would benefit. The Court asserted, however, that
such "practical considerations" play no role in constitutional ad-
judication except as a prudential basis for judicial self-restraint. 86
That is a bit like saying that brakes have no function in driving
other than to retard forward progress. Such considerations are
exactly the kind that the Court should evaluate before creating new
constitutional law-particularly when creating new affirmative du-
ties rather than merely negating state policy.'
The dissenting opinions in Rodriguez helped to highlight the
"unprecedented upheaval" that acceptance of the plaintiffs' theory
would have entailed. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and
Douglas, tucked away in a footnote his novel major premise that
the equal protection clause supports the "goal of providing local
government with realistic choices as to how much money should be
expended on education. ' 88 He noted that the only revenue-raising
mechanism authorized for school districts is the property tax, and
that because of interdistrict variance in the value of taxable prop-
erty, equivalent tax effort will not produce equivalent revenue results.
But is it the limitation of school districts to a single revenue-raising
instrument that makes the Texas system one resting on a "classifi-
cation" lacking a "rational relationship to a permissible object? '89
This seems unlikely, since an authorized school district income tax
would still produce nonequivalent revenue results if interdistrict
personal income patterns varied widely. Alternatively, were the dis-
limits. Food, shelter, and a good home life could all become derivative fundamental in-
terests. Id. at 33-37.85 Id. at 56.
61 Id. at 58.
87 Courts typically have had insufficient evidence to make realistic judgments about the
practical consequences of their decisions. This deficiency might be corrected if courts were
presented with "Brandeis briefs" detailing probable consequences of court decisions. In
traditional due process litigation, the function of the "Brandeis brief" was to show the
reasonableness of pursuing the new policy already politically chosen. By contrast, substan-
tive equal protection litigation is frequently directed toward restructuring a program which
in practical terms cannot be abandoned (e.g., public schools, apportionment of legislatures,
operation of state prisons and mental hospitals). The "Brandeis brief" I suggest would
show reasons why a court should not impose new affirmative duties on government, or at
least not impose them in the vague, litigation-spawning way often requested by plaintiffs.
88 411 U.S. at 68 n.6.
89 Id. at 67.
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senters really extracting from the equal protection clause a re-
quirement of substantially equal results, i.e., a system guaranteeing
"each district an equal per-pupil revenue from the state school-
financing system"?90 This was flatly denied by Justice White. And
yet, in effect, this is what the district court apparently decreed
when it said that "the quality of public education"--not, it may be
noted, merely the equal availability of taxable wealth-"may not be
a function of wealth, other than the wealth of the state as a
whole."91 Justice Marshall's separate dissent explicitly focused on
what the state provided its children, not the effect of spending on
educational achievement. 92 To achieve equality in expenditure, he
suggested several remedial options93 to eliminate differential ex-
penditure as a factor contributing to "inequality ... of educational
opportunity. ' 94
Very basic questions in social theory are raised by Rodriguez.
Even though there may be major disagreement about assuring
equal distribution of goods throughout society, there has been a
fairly broad consensus in support of equality of opportunity. There
also is general consensus on the wisdom and morality of disallow-
ing consideration of class differences, personal characteristics, and
indeed any indicia other than "merit" in distributing societal
benefits and burdens. But how equal must opportunity be in order
to ensure that merit is the sole deciding factor? This question lies
at the core of the Rodriguez litigation. Although there are obvious
limits on the extent to which government can guarantee common
starting points for all children, should there at least be relatively
common and equal base lines in the quality of elementary and
secondary education? In view of the practical importance of educa-
tion in American life today, does not equal protection at least re-
quire that the quality of compulsory public education not be mate-
rially affected by differential financial support, attributable to the
accidental factors of parentage and parental residence? Perhaps we
should have a system resting on a concept of equal distribution of
educational offerings. 95 But is it the function of the judiciary to
9 0 Id. at 68.
91 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex. 1971)
(per curiam) (emphasis added).
92 411 U.S. at 83-84.
93 Id. at 130-31 n.98.
94 Id. at 90.
91 On an asserted right to be subsidized in a different context, see Citizens for Under-
ground Equality v. City of Seattle, 6 Wash. App. 338, 492 P.2d 1071 (1972), where the
court rejected the argument that special assessment financing was unconstitutional because
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impose such a system by distorting the equal protection clause and
entwining the judiciary in an ongoing managerial process, any
more than it was properly the function of an earlier Court to
impose laissez-faire capitalism on the states by distorting the due
process clause?
Consider the power the judiciary would have wielded had
the dissenters in Rodriguez prevailed. A decision that interdis-
trict wealth differentials could not be reflected in school expendi-
tures (and the matter logically could not have been confined to
school expenditures) 96 would be tantamount to saying that local
government as we have known it is unconstitutional. 97 Logically,
would interstate disparities also suffer the same fate?98 Could
federalism itself be suspect because it collides with a fundamental
right to public education (perhaps shifted from the fourteenth to
the fifth amendment) on a relatively equal funding basis?99 CouldI
poorer neighborhoods were unable to participate in the program (which involved putting
overhead utility wires underground).
96 Surely such peripheral matters as transportation to school, general library resources
in the community, and even sports facilities can also be educationally-related benefits af-
fected by differential local wealth, and thus differentially affecting total educational oppor-
tunity. Nor should it be relevant that libraries and sport facilities normally are provided by
the municipality, not the school district, for recognition of that distinction would permit
gerrymandering-by-function to override an alleged constitutional right.
97 On the question of equal-protection-based suits to improve municipal services other
than education, see Beal v. Lindsay, 468 F.2d 287 (2d Cir. 1972); Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw, 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Selmont Improvement Ass'n v. Dallas County
Comm'n, 339 F. Supp. 477 (S.D. Ala. 1972). The suit- rocused on a restricted local inequity
and did not attempt to achieve statewide equality of st. tce.
Plaintiffs substantially prevailed in Hawkins and Selmnt Improvement in the context of
black versus white neighborhoods in the South. But in Beal, Judge Friendly noted proof
that the rundown condition of a park in a black and Puerto Rican area of the Bronx was
due to vandalism, despite more than equal input by the City, and concluded that "attain-
ment of equal results" in such a situation was not constitutionally mandated. 468 F.2d at
290. See also Fresler & May, The Municipal Service Equalization Suit: A Cause of Action in Quest
of a Forum, in PUBLIC NEEDS AND PRIVATE BEHAVIOR IN METROPOLITAN AREAS 157 (J. Jack-
son ed. 1975); Bond, Toward Equal Delivery of Municipal Services in the Central Cities, 4
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 263 (1976); Lineberry, Mandating Urban Equality: The Distribution of
Municipal Public Services, 53 TEx. L. REV. 26 (1974).
98 "If the doctrine in Serrano is pursued to its logical conclusion, there should be only
one government that levies taxes and distributes their proceeds among the multitudinous
claimants for public funds: the national government." Freeman, in THE 1972 FOUR-DAY
UNIVERSITY OF BOARDSMANSHIP PROCEEDINGS, NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARDS ASSOCIATION,
AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE REPRINT No. 7, at 55 (1972).
99 This approaches reductio ad absurdum. To be sure, the process of constitutionaliz-
ing various congressional impositions of new duties on the states has significantly expanded
the national authority under the Constitution. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966); Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 603 (1975). However, in a major recent federalism decision the Court nullified that
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the process of intervention with private choices even end at this
point? Suppose the state did intervene massively at one end of
the resources-versus-needs equation, and rearranged resources so
that there was equality in educational offering."1 " Could the state
then ignore the other end-the input of needs-leaving those needs
uncontrolled and dominated perhaps by socially detrimental pri-
vate choices, each made in isolation? 10 India's serious exploration
of the idea of mandatory birth control' 0 2 relates in a very basic way
portion of the Fair Standards Amendments of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)-(x) (Supp. V 1975)
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d)-(x) (1970)), extending the wages, hours, and overtime re-
quirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act to all nonsupervisory state and local em-
ployees. National League of Cities v. Usery, 96 S. Ct. 2465 (1976). In Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362 (1976), Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the Court, continued to emphasize the
principles of federalism by refusing equitable relief to Philadelphia plaintiffs alleging a gen-
eral pattern of police misconduct. The Court held that such relief would represent an un-
warranted invasion by the federal judiciary into the discretionary authority granted to the
police by state and local law. See also Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. granted,
426 U.S. 904 (1976) (Clean Air Act Amendments cases). These cases, now awaiting Supreme
Court action, concern congressional power to require states not merely to refrain from
certain practices, but to affirmatively exercise their police powers in prescribed ways. How-
ever, the limitations and duties imposed, or sought to be imposed, in these cases are the
products of congressional action, and do not involve a major national reallocation of limited
resources.
With respect to "nationalizing Serrano," what remedy would there be for congressional
inaction? Would an attempted suit against Congress or an attempt to withhold taxes on
grounds of disagreement with national policy be dismissed promptly under the somewhat
battered "political question" doctrine? See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974);
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). The es-
sence of the doctrine in United States v. Nixon-namely, the availability of judicially discov-
erable and manageable standards--seems to be what Justice Powell had in the back of his
mind when he spoke in Rodriguez of "the wisdom of the traditional limitations on this
Court's function." San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
100 Justice Marshall in Rodriguez expressly separated the question of "what the children
are able to do with what they receive." Id. at 84 (dissenting opinion, Marshall, J.).
101 A hypothetical may help sharpen the question. Assume that wealth, however de-
fined, is relatively equal in two districts, but that one district has two children per family
and the other district uniformly has five children per family. Resources are therefore
spread more thinly in the latter district, on a per child basis. Would it be appropriate, by
judicially-imposed constitutional mandate, to force the district with the lower birth rate to
subsidize the education of the larger families in the district with the higher birth rate? If
this were done, would pressure develop for more intervention by "family planners" in the
lives of the families in the high birth rate district?
102 The government of India announced recently that residents of federally-adminis-
tered New Delhi could face loss of jobs and public assistance if they exceed two children
per family. The Indian states have been encouraged to experiment with similar regula-
tions. N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1976, at 1, col. 3; id. Mar. 9, 1976, at 33, col. 2.
Recently Justice Powell hypothesized in his concurring opinion in Cleveland Bd. of
Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1974), that on the basis of Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), it would be constitutional to "seek to discourage excessive population
growth by limiting tax deductions for dependents." In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471
(1970), the Court upheld a maximum selfare grant regulation which had the effect of
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to the concept of effective equality of opportunity, lest it become
merely an equality in respect to shrinking opportunities in an over-
crowded field.
C. Irrebuttable Presumptions
Another major variant in current equal protection analysis,
although nominally sounding in due process, is the so-called "ir-
rebuttable presumption" doctrine. This doctrine can, like "strict
scrutiny," cause sudden death for the legislative classification to
which it is applied. Unlike the strict scrutiny test, however, the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine can be applied whether or not
the case involves fundamental rights or suspect classifications. Al-
though rooted in earlier cases, 113 the doctrine did not become a
major decisional device until 1973 and 1974.'14 Its nature and also
its difficulties are well-exemplified by Vlandis v. Kline.' 5
In Vlandis the Court nullified a Connecticut rule limiting eligi-
bility for the low in-state tuition schedule at state colleges to those
students who could show a meaningful pre-admission nexus with
the state. The formula, concededly somewhat inartistic, denied the
lower rates to married students whose legal address at the time of
application was outside the state, and to unmarried students whose
legal address was outside the state during any part of the year
preceding the application date. For both categories, ineligibility
continued as long as the individuals were students. Because the
formula was phrased simply in terms of residence (i.e., legal
domicile), the Court brushed aside the argument that it was merely
designed to recognize and reward the investments in higher educa-
reducing the per capita benefits to children in the largest families (eight or more). Strict
scrutiny was not applied and under the lower standard of equal protection scrutiny, the
policy was deemed rational. Although he dissented from the ruling, Justice Marshall did
note that "the effect of the maximum grant regulation upon the right of procreation is
marginal and indirect at best, totally unlike the compulsory sterilization law that was at
issue in Skinner." Id. at 521 n.14.
103 See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971);
Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
Long before the rise of modern equal protection concerns, the Court invalidated as
denying fair opportunity to rebut certain tax laws providing that gifts made within a
specified time prior to death were presumptively made in contemplation of death. Heiner
v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932); Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206 (1931); Schlesinger
v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230 (1926). Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Vlandis v. Kline, 412
U.S. 441, 467-68 (1973), characterized these decisions as the product of "a day when the
principles of substantive due process had reached their zenith in this Court."
104 See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); United States Dep't of
Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
105 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
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tion made over the years by established Connecticut residents. The
way was then open to apply the irrebuttable presumption label and
nullify the formula. As the Court noted, it was "not necessarily or
universally true in fact" that recently arrived students had no bona
fide intent to transfer their domicile to Connecticut. 0 6
The decisional technique here contains the following elements:
(1) ascertaining the purpose to be achieved by statutory classifica-
tion; (2) ascertaining the group which must be dealt with to achieve
that purpose; and (3) determining whether there is an exact "fit"
between this theoretical group and the group actually identified by
the statutory classification.10 7 If there is not an exact fit-if, as in
Vlandis, the presumption of lack of domiciliary intent is over-
inclusive-then the classification is nullified. The irrebutable pre-
sumption doctrine nominally sounds in due process insofar as it
focuses on the need for a hearing in which an individual can show
that he does not come within the apparent purpose of the
statute, t 18 even though he is "caught" by being a member of the
excluded class. But because the doctrine focuses essentially on the
classification, the inexact fit between the basic fact (e.g., in Vlandis
pre-admission nonresidency) and the presumed fact (continued
lack of domiciliary intent while a student), it has been viewed by
virtually all commentators as more closely akin to equal protection's
strict scrutiny standard. 1 9 True due process analysis requires the
presence of a life, liberty, or property interest as a precondition of
entitlement to a hearing.""1 Under the irrebuttable presumption
approach, however, the Court seems to elevate a simple principle
of the law of evidence, concerning the correspondence of proved
106 Id. at 452.
107 In the language of presumptions, the identifiable group encompassed by the
statutory classification is the "basic fact." That this group coincides with the theoretical
group which the legislation is designed to reach is the "presumed fact."
108 Defining "purpose" is not easy in any legislative process. Justice Rehnquist, dissent-
ing in United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 522 (1973), referred to the
Court's opinion in that case as resting on what the majority "conceive[d] to be the legisla-
tive aim." See generally Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitu-
tional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95.
109 See Bezanson, Some Thoughts on the Emerging Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine, 7 IND.
L. REV. 644 (1974); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 HARV.
L. REV. 1534 (1974); Note, The Conclusive Presumption Doctrine: Equal Process or Due
Protection?, 72 MICH. L. REv. 800 (1974); Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis,
27 STAN. L. REV. 449 (1975). See also Comment, Constitutional Law: Court Substitutes Conclu-
sive Presumption Approach for Equal Protection Analysis, 58 MINN. L. REv. 965 (1974). The first
four of these sources also subject the doctrine to an incisive critique and essentially reject it.
110 On the requisites of "entitlement," see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974)
(plurality opinion); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Perry v. Sindermann,
408 U.S. 593 (1972). See also Note, 72 MICH. L. REv., supra note 109, at 816-21.
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facts and presumed facts, 1 ' to the level of a constitutional princi-
ple justifying invalidation of substantive legislative policies. The
Court does this without confronting the merits of the legislative
policy, the reasonableness of the statute's classification, or the
feasibility of alternative means." 2 The irrebuttable presumption
doctrine almost makes a mockery of the familiar "ends-means"
analysis, which is a part of both due process and equal protection,
by requiring perfect means.
Under careful analysis, 1 3 however, are the results in the ir-
rebuttable presumption cases, as distinguished from the doctrine
itself, defensible? Did the Court employ this new decisional prin-
ciple in the early 1970's as a practical device to reach desired out-
comes in particular cases? Many of the results reached under
the strict scrutiny doctrine in the late 1960's could have been
achieved more honestly under the old, much-criticized, substantive
due process doctrine." 4 But the price of reverting to substantive
due process would have been revelation of the true breadth of
I" See Justice Rehnquist's remonstrance in United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413
U.S. 508, 524 (1973): "Thus, we deal not with the law of evidence, but with the extent to
which the Fifth Amendment permits this Court to invalidate such a determination by Con-
gress."
112 The belief of some Justices during this period that prophylactic rules were un-
necessary and that administrative procedures could solve all problems is disturbing, and
decidedly nonempirical. See United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 518-19
(1973) (concurring opinion, Marshall, J.) (suggesting that Congress could easily provide an
administrative mechanism to guarantee elimination of abuse from the program, and that
"reasonable rules" could be devised to simplify the hearing process). This assurance has a
hollow ring in light of recent reports of welfare fraud amounting to millions of dollars,
and the relative failure of corrective measures. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Apr. 11, 1975, at 38,
col. 5; id., Jan. 13, 1975, at 47, col. 4.
Even in areas illuminated by past litigation, such as the legal residence concept, the
cases demonstrate the difficulty of achieving easy and accurate determinations. See Texas v.
Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939); In re Dorrance's Estate, 115 N.J. Eq. 268, 170 A. 601 (Pre-
rog. Ct), modified, 116 N.J. Eq. 204, 172 A. 503 (Prerog. Ct. 1934), affd sub nom. Dorrance
v. Thayer-Martin, 13 N.J. Misc. 168, 176 A. 902 (Sup. Ct. 1935) (per curiam), aff'd, 116
N.J.L. 362, 184 A. 743 (per curiam), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 678 (1936); Matter of Newcomb,
192 N.Y. 238, 84 N.E. 950 (1908); In re Dorrance's Estate, 309 Pa. 151, 163 A. 303, cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 660 (1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 617 (1933); Hammerstein v. Hammerstein,
269 S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954).
In the case of college students, for example, the ease of "establishing" a new domicile
by acquiring driver's licenses and voting registration is so great that it would not be worth-
while for the state to try to contest. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 464-65 (1973)
(dissenting opinion, Rehnquist, J.).
113 Such careful analysis is found in some of the dissents-especially those of Justice
Rehnquist.
114 See Karst, Invidious Discrimination: Justice Douglas and the Return of the "Natural-Law-
Due-Process Formula," 16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 716 (1969).
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judicial discretion being exercised, thus raising old shibboleths
about the Court as a super-legislature. 1 15 Moreover, the new equal
protection itself came under heavy attack from inside the Court as
overly simplistic. Once a classification was found to be "suspect"
per se or to trench on a "fundamental interest," the state's burden
to show a "compelling interest" became so heavy that invalidation
was almost automatic. 1 6 The list of "suspect" classes" 7 and "fun-
damental" rights" 8 soon stopped growing, not only because of the
Burger Court's ethic of judicial restraint, but also because the War-
ren Court exhausted the supply of easy cases.
The irrebuttable presumption doctrine has thus provided the
Court, although generally without the support of Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, with a way to invalidate, on a nomi-
nally objective basis, those extremes in classification that offend the
Court's sense of justice. The doctrine's virtue is also its vice, be-
cause its objective basis (i.e., lack of a close fit between the defined
target and the real target) could justify nullification of thousands
of statutes. To a large degree, all legislation is classification," 19 just
as all districting is gerrymandering. 20 There is always inexactness
of fit, and the only relevant question is how much inexactness is
constitutionally tolerable, leaving major corrections to the political
process.
If the Supreme Court's irrebuttable presumption decisions are
re-rationalized on their facts, a somewhat more appealing picture
emerges. Most of the cases involved interests that were special, if
not actually fundamental. The challenged classifications were ques-
tionable even under an ends-means analysis of medium severity
115 The outcries would have been especially anguished from Justice Black, who was
even willing to rewrite history to avoid basing decisions on the "evanescent standards" of
due process and its natural law infusion. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 177 (1952)
(concurring opinion, Black, J.); Kelly, Clio and The Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup.
CT. REV. 119, 120-21, 132-36; Morrison, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
Rights?-The Judicial Interpretation, 2 STAN. L. REV. 140, 166-67 (1949).
For a more recent example, see the comments of Justice Marshall concurring in Vlan-
dis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 455 (19.73), in which Justice Rehnquist, dissenting, openly
charged the majority with reaching an essentially unrationalized substantive due process
result by using the irrebuttable presumption label.
16 See the despairing comment of Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Dunn v. Blum-
stein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972).117 See text accompanying notes 55-65 supra.
"
8 See text accompanying notes 66-67 supra.
19 On the potential reach of a simplistic irrebuttable presumption doctrine, see Note,
72 MICH. L. REV., supra note 109, at 830-34.
2I R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS
459-63 (1968).
19771
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
(i.e., the "strong rational basis" test 21). Carrington v. Rash,'22 osten-
sibly decided under the irrebuttable presumption doctrine, in-
volved the interest of a serviceman in being able to vote in a state
where he was stationed; and voting is an interest actually deemed
fundamental.123 Stanley v. Illinois, 2 4 in which the Court struck
down a statutory presumption that putative fathers were unfit par-
ents, involved both an "almost fundamental" interest (parental in-
terest in child-rearing) and a near-suspect classification (illegitima-
cy). In United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry,x25 the Court
nullified a federal regulation that denied food stamps to any house-
hold containing a person claimed as a tax dependent by his par-
ents. Although the Court based its decision on a finding of an ir-
rebuttable presumption, the regulation was also susceptible to
attack under the doctrine of Goldberg v. Kelly, 126 since it could have
had the effect of denying food stamps to those in genuine need.
Bell v. Burson,' 27 insofar as it is an irrebuttable presumption case at
all, is easily explicable as a case in which the Court insisted on a
certain level of adjudicative fairness because the state was proceed-
ing against a person on the basis of his personal conduct 12 8 (in con-
trast to legislating a general prophylactic rule on a class basis). All
of the foregoing cases thus touched on interests of special sensitiv-
ity, and could probably have been decided the same way without
invocation of the irrebutable presumption doctrine.
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur,129 a very different case,
is especially intriguing. LaFleur and its companion case involved
rules imposing mandatory leave for public school teachers in mid-
pregnancy. From one standpoint, this was an intrusion upon a
12, See notes 155-204 and accompanying text infra. There is no agreed label for the
test and each writer devises his own-all perhaps more quotable than informational. See
text accompanying note 41 supra.
122 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
123See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23
(1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
124 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
12F 413 U.S. 508 (1973).
126 397 U.S. 254 (1970). There is a significant doctrinal difference. In Murry, any ad-
verse impact was general and rested equally on all those within the legislatively defined
class. In Goldberg, the ineligibility turned on the recipient's conduct; i.e., on circumstances
unique to the recipient himself. In administrative law terms, Murry dealt with rulemaking,
while Goldberg dealt with adjudication.
12 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
125 In Bell, the problem involved the state's administration of its policy concerning un-
insured motorists involved in accidents; concededly, a matter of significant state concern.
The challenged practice was that an uninsured motorist involved in an accident faced loss
of his license piior to any determination of fault in the accident.
129 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
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personal liberty associated with family life, although John Stuart
Mill might rejoin by observing that the real issue was the "other-
regarding" act of holding onto a classroom job. 13 0 The underlying
legislative purpose for the rules was quite obscure, and probably
did not coincide with any of the purposes that the state lamely tried
to use for justification. For example, the asserted interest in con-
tinuity of instruction is actually disserved by removing a healthy
teacher from the classroom where birth is not anticipated until
more than a month after the end of the semester. Moreover, any
correlation between physical unfitness and pregnancy would be
higher in early pregnancy than in mid-pregnancy. If the real ba-
sis for mandatory pregnancy leave is deference to "outmoded
taboos"'131 against appearing in public while pregnant, then the
rule is founded on a rapidly disappearing and nonrationalized cus-
tom. In such a context the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may
act as a "legal euthanasia" device. Judicial invalidation of the rule is
painless to the legislature-which thereby avoids the trauma of
voting to repeal-and harmless to the judicial system, because the
invalidation assertedly rests on the lack of a factual nexus rather
than on a value judgment. 32
13' It is well to return to Mill's distinction, even if oversimplified, between self-
regarding acts (e.g., consensual sexual conduct, for which near-absolute liberty can be jus-
tified), and other-regarding acts, which involve community relations and third-party im-
pacts (e.g., having a child, or asking the community to adjust to one's personal disability).
See J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 21-22 (London 1859): "[Ihe sole end for which mankind are
warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection .... Over himself, over his own body -and.mind, the indi-
vidual is sovereign." Whether Mill would agree with the examples given above is unknown;
they are examples of realistic hard choices testing his principles.
131 Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 641 n.9 (1974) (Stewart, J.). With
respect to Justice Stewart's concept of "outmoded taboos," it may be noted that there was a
noticeable regional variation in the lower court decisions on mandatory pregnancy leaves at
the time the Court decided LaFleur. Mandatory leaves had been voided in the Sixth Circuit
(Ohio) in LaFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th Cir. 1972), in the Second
Circuit (Connecticut) in Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973), and
in the Tenth Circuit (Oklahoma) in Buckley v. Coyle Pub. School Sys., 476 F.2d 92 (10th
Cir. 1973). They had been sustained in the Fourth Circuit (Virginia) in Cohen v. Chester-
field County Sch. Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th Cir. 1973) (the companion case to LaFleur in the
Supreme Court), and in the Fifth Circuit (Texas) in Schattman v. Texas Employment
Comm'n, 459 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973).
132 Lawrence Tribe rests his lonely defense of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine
on the ground that it is a way of neatly attacking rules in a period of "moral flux." But this
is to take an exotic instance-forLaFleur is the only one of the irrebuttable presumption cases
so explicable-and use it to justify a general doctrine potentially destructive of the demo-
cratic process. See Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 311 (1975).
For a different calculation of risk in open-ended judicial participation in the revision and,
necessarily, legalization of moral consciousness, see W. ELLIOT, THE RISE OF GUARDIAN
DEMOCRACY (1974).
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The re-rationalization process falters, however, when Vlandis is
reached. That decision still seems highly questionable. If public
education does not give rise to a fundamental interest triggering
strict scrutiny, 133 then certainly graduate education is not imbued
with interests of special sensitivity.'1 4 It is not prima facie un-
reasonable to make various entitlements turn on an enduring rela-
tion to the state. The Court has validated a durational residence
requirement as a precondition to obtaining a divorce, 135 as well as a
Minnesota one-year durational residence requirement for special
in-state tuition rates. 136
The focus in all constitutional litigation really should be on
substance rather than form, 31 and the matter really comes down
to a question of permissible margin of error. This point is illus-
trated in a lower court case concerning the age requirement for
first grade admission. In 1975, the federal district court in Maine
rejected a challenge to the familiar "age-six" eligibility rules for
first grade. 138 Obviously, it is "not necessarily or universally true in
In a situation similar to LaFleur, the Court nullified a Utah statute that made women
ineligible for employment compensation benefits for a period extending from 12 weeks
before the expected birth to six weeks after childbirth. Turner v. Department of Employ-
ment Sec., 423 U.S. 44 (1975).
... See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-37 (1973).
134 In Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 463 (1973), Justice Douglas and the Chief Justice
joined Justice Rehnquist in dissent. Justice Douglas's role in the irrebuttable presumption
cases was puzzling. He wrote the opinion of the Court in one of the Food Stamp cases,
United States Dep't of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973). But in another Food Stamp
case, Department of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973), where the majority, eschewing
irrebuttable presumption analysis, found instead a lack of minimum rationality in a rule
barring food stamps for households containing unrelated individuals, Justice Douglas
agreed with the dissenters (Justice Rehnquist and the Chief Justice) that this minimum test
had been met. He concurred with the majority, however, on the distinctive ground of
preserving a first amendment right of freedom of association. Id. at 542-45.
135 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
136 Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F. Supp. 234 (D. Minn. 1970), affd mem., 401 U.S. 985
(1971). The Starns ruling was endorsed in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,452 (1973).
137 The point is perceptively put by one commentator as follows:
Rather than asking whether the legislature has established an irrebuttable pre-
sumption, the Court should inquire whether the legislature may constitutionally
do what it has in fact effected through the provision, independent of any explicit
or implicit presumption contained therein. In effect, the judicial role should be to
decide whether particular consequences may constitutionally turn on a particular
fact situation, not whether evidence must be allowed to defeat the validity of that
particular fact situation as a classifying criterion. The question is substantive
rather than procedural.
Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 449, 464 (1975) (foot-
notes omitted).
138 Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (D. Me. 1975).
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fact ' 139 that all children under six lack school readiness. 40 Under
a simplistic irrebuttable presumption analysis, the classification
would be vulnerable. The state was fortunate, however, in having
available an empirical study of school readiness. From this the
court could conclude that, although errors would occur, the "age-
six" classification was a reasonably accurate substitute for detailed
individual testing-a costly, time-consuming process that would in-
volve its own uncertainties. 4 ' In effect the court utilized a medium
level rationality test, aided by the Supreme Court's earlier rejection
of the proposition that education is a fundamental interest. Under
strict scrutiny review a state would have difficulty proving that
individualized determinations were impossible.' 42
139 The quoted phrase matches the Court's language in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
452 (1973).
140 It might also be asserted that not all children six or over are ready for school, and
that allowing the "unready" to attend diminishes the effectiveness of education for those
who are ready. If it ever were established that there is a constitutional duty to offer some
training to the retarded, the underlying constitutional principle would be that there is a
right to that level of education from which one may maximally benefit, and hence a right
to special education for gifted students. See Cuyahoga County Ass'n for Retarded Children
& Adults v. Essex, 411 F. Supp. 46 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (no invidious discrimination found in
limiting education for the mentally handicapped by available funding, and excluding chil-
dren who were not acceptably toilet-trained). Cf. Ackerman v. Rubin, 35 Misc. 2d 707, 231
N.Y.S.2d 112 (Sup. CL), aff'd mere., 17 App. Div. 2d 796, 232 N.Y.S.2d 872 (1st Dep't
1962) (no arbitrariness in denying grade acceleration to ten year-old because of insufficient
age).
141 Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853, 856-57 (D. Me. 1975). See also the rejection
of a challenge to minimum age requirements for service in the state legislature in Wurtzel
v. Falcey, 69 N.J. 401, 354 A.2d 617 (1976) (per curiam). The Court said that strict
scrutiny was not triggered because there is no fundamental right to run for office, nor is
age a suspect classification. It did not discuss the irrebuttable presumption doctrine; i.e.,
the possible argument that the age picked created an irrebuttable presumption of immatur-
ity below the designated age.
142 A more questionable ruling, although understandable because the facts evoke sym-
pathy, is the recent lower court decision voiding on irrebuttable presumption grounds a
school board's policy of barring blind teachers from teaching English to sighted children.
Gurmankin v. Costanzo, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976). It may not be "universally true"
that blindness prevents a teacher from effectively instructing sighted children in English
(setting aside any question of disciplinary problems). But, unlike the "first grade case"
(Hammond v. Marx, 406 F. Supp. 853 (D. Me. 1975)), the court in Gurmankin cited no
evidence on the degree of correspondence between blindness and lowered teaching per-
formance in a sighted classroom, or concerning the relevance of varied levels of student
ability. The court cited both the case nullifying mandatory pregnancy leaves (LaFleur) and
the case upholding the nine-month marriage rule for widows' eligibility for Social Security
benefits (Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)), and found the blind teacher's case to
be closer to the former than the latter. 411 F. Supp. at 989-92.
One can hypothesize two further suits that suggest the difficulties attending vigorous
judicial review of personnel classifications in the field of education. First, suppose both
blind and sighted teachers teach in a sighted school, and parents of children assigned to a
blind English teacher sue, claiming that their children are denied equal protection in com-
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In 1975 the Supreme Court apparently perceived that it had
unbottled a djinn with the powerful but unrationalized irrebuttable
presumption doctrine. In Weinberger v. Salfi,143 the Court rejected
an attack on a rule that made a widow who had married less than
nine months before her husband's death ineligible for Social Se-
curity benefits-a sort of durational wifehood rule. Conceding that
the nine-month classification would not infallibly distinguish inves-
tor widows from loving spouses, the Court nevertheless upheld the
classification as a reasonable prophylactic rule:
[T]he question raised is not whether a statutory provision pre-
cisely filters out those, and only those, who are in the factual
position which generated the congressional concern reflected in
the statute. Such a rule would ban all prophylactic provisions ....
The question is whether Congress, its concern having been
reasonably aroused by the possibility of an abuse which it legiti-
mately desired to avoid, could rationally have concluded both
that a particular limitation or qualification would protect against
its occurrence, and that the expense and other difficulties of
individual determinations justified the inherent imprecision of a
prophylactic rule.144
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that it was possible to uphold the clas-
sification in Salfi without disturbing the prior rulings in such cases
as Stanley v. Illinois and LaFleur, because "a noncontractual claim to
receive funds from the public treasury enjoys no constitutionally
protected status." 14 5 In this statement there is a profound shift
from the previous simplistic approach. The inquiry is to focus not
just on inexactness of fit between the basic fact and the presumed
fact, but on whether a status related to a constitutional guarantee is
affected. This kind of inquiry would tame the irrebuttable pre-
sumption doctrine and bring it within the conventional range of
statutory review where the central task is delineation of substantive
constitutional rights.
Salfi involved another limiting circumstance (although only
parison with other children assigned to sighted teachers. Second, suppose only blind
teachers are assigned to teach blind children, and the blind children's parents sue, claiming
denial of equal protection in comparison with children assigned to a sighted teacher. Do
these cases raise questions suitable for handling under either the irrebuttable presumption
doctrine or strict scrutiny? Or do they instead raise highly complicated issues of educa-
tional policy and finance, such that any judicial action would amount to a policy dialogue
rather than reasoned adjudication? See generally Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Consti-
tution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703 (1975), and references therein to the writings of Professors
Bork, Ely, Epstein, Linde, and Winter, criticizing judicial adventuring.
143 422 U.S. 749 (1975).
144d. at 777.
145 Id. at 772.
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mentioned in passing by the Court): namely, impracticality of per-
sonalized hearings. In the cases where the Court has invalidated
state policy on irrebuttable presumption grounds, the majority Jus-
tices have either stated or assumed that individualized determina-
tions were feasible, and would be offered if the state felt the policy
was worth the expense and effort of hearings (e.g., in respect to
need in Murry or physical fitness in LaFleur). But in the Salfi situa-
tion, involving the intimacies of marital relations, the majority ex-
pressed doubt that hearings could "filter out" all error, "since
neither marital intent, life expectancy, nor knowledge of terminal
illness" is "reliably determinable.' '1 46
In Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,147 a 1976 case,
the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a law that required state
police officers to retire at the relatively young age of fifty. The
district court had voided the classification, noting that the state
already required regular medical examinations of police officers as
a matter of course, thus allowing for individualized retirement
decisions:
On this record we find that mandatory retirement at age 50,
where individualized medical screening is not only available but
already required, is no more rational, and no more related to a
protectable state interest, than the mandatory suspension or dis-
charge of school teachers upon reaching their fourth or fifth
month of pregnancy. 148
146 Id. at 782-83.
147 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) (per curiam), rev'g 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974).
In a footnote, the district court had queried whether a law mandating retirement at
age 70 would present a different case. 376 F. Supp. at 756 n.9. The court may have
assumed that at 70 there would be a closer "fit" between the basic fact of age and the
presumed fact of inability to work. But the trouble with irrebuttable presumption analysis,
or indeed any level of equal protection analysis above minimal rationality, is that it fails to
tell us how close the "fit" must be. Some inexactness will always be present. Nor is the
problem solved by Justice Marshall's preference for a flexible intermediate level of scrutiny
keyed to such imponderables as "the importance of the governmental benefits denied, the
character of the class, and the asserted state interests." 96 S. Ct. at 2571 (dissenting opinion).
At this point the "new" equal protection simply becomes substantive due process. See also
Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 96 S. Ct. 2882 (1976) (sustaining various irrebuttable
and rebuttable presumptions in complicated Black Lung Benefits Act (30 U.S.C. §§ 901,
902, 921-924, 931-934, 936-940, 951 (Supp. V 1975))). The presumptions operate in favor
of the private claimant, so the case is not analogous to the typical recent irrebuttable pre-
sumption cases. But the presumptions in the Act also run against the coal mine operators,
who are expected to assume the cost of the program on transfer from the federal govern-
ment. The absence of an adverse impact on a personalized interest may explain the Court's
leniency here, in contrast to its increasing distaste, since Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975), for irrebuttable presumption analysis.
148 Murgia v. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement, 376 F. Supp. 753, 756 (D. Mass. 1974),
rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976) (per curiam).
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This reasoning ignores the obvious point that more than medical
data is relevant to performance evaluation.
The Murgia case demonstrates that challenges to arbitrary age
classifications or cutoff dates so common in legislation can be
grounded either in irrebuttable presumption or equal protection
doctrine. The district court in Murgia felt that the arbitrary age
cutoff did not have even a rational basis, but it also cited the
LaFleur case with its irrebuttable presumption principle. 149 The
Supreme Court's per curiam opinion reversing the district court
ignored the irrebuttable presumption doctrine and found rational-
ity because physical ability "generally" declines with age.150
The "equality" interest at stake in the irrebuttable presump-
tion cases is the philosophic principle of distributive justice, i.e.,
that persons in similar situations should be treated similarly. Justice
Marshall provided the most explicit statement of this principle in
his Murry concurrence, although he confused the doctrine by liken-
ing it to the "fairness" principle of the due process clause.1 51
Nevertheless, treating like alike is a widely accepted philosophical
goal.1 52 It is also an important aspect of equal treatment under the
law when the state proceeds against an individual, qua individual, as
in Bell v. Burson.153 Yet, the feasibility of rigidly implementing the
principle of treating similars similarly is questionable under the
American (or any democratic) system, which is more suited to
' 376 F. Supp. at 756.
150 96 S. Ct. at 2567-68. Interestingly, however, the Court indicated that such an arbi-
trary classification might not be minimally rational if the plaintiff could show that the law
"has the effect of excluding from service so few officers who are in fact unqualified as to
render age 50 a criterion wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute." 96 S. CL at
2568.
The Court avoided decision in another interesting irrebuttable presumption case, An-
drews v. Drew Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir. 1975), by dismissing the
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. 425 U.S. 559 (1976). The rule at issue barred
parents of illegitimate children from employment as public school teachers' aides, and had
been voided by the lower courts on irrebuttable presumption grounds. 507 F.2d at 614-15.
In a third case, Lavine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577 (1976), the Court upheld a presumption
under New York law that, "in the absence of evidence to the contrary," a welfare applicant
who voluntarily terminates employment 75 days or less before his application does so in
order to obtain welfare, and thereby becomes subject to a 75-day waiting period. 424 U.S.
at 579-80.
Because the district court in Murgia used the presumption doctrine only as an alterna-
tive basis for decision, and since the Supreme Court failed even to mention it in its Murgia
opinion, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine may be dead without a decent burial.
151 "One aspect of fundamental fairness, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment, is that individuals similarly situated must receive the same treatment by
the Government." 413 U.S. at 517 (concurring opinion, Marshall, J.).
152 See commentators cited in note 36 supra.
53 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
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operating by general rules emanating from a legislature than by
the ad hoc, individualized discretion of a chancellor. 154
D. Reversion from "Strict Scrutiny" to "Strong Rational Basis"
The "strong rational basis" test, a middle level review between
minimum rationality and strict scrutiny, is not the product of a
single Supreme Court opinion, and its contours are not entirely
clear. In a series of cases since 1971, the Court has turned its back
on the spirit of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 155 and has often
refused to uphold statutes merely because reasons could be con-
ceived to justify the classifications made.' 56 The Court is now more
inclined to ascertain the actual purpose of the legislation, and to
measure the classification against that purpose.
The beginnings of the strong rational basis test appeared in
some of the sex and illegitimacy cases discussed earlier.15 7 In those
cases, the Court applied a stringent level of review which, although
short of strict scrutiny, normally resulted in invalidation of the
challenged provision.1 58 In Reed v. Reed,'5 9 after a bow to the old
equal protection, the Court invalidated a provision that gave a
preference to men over women in appointments as administrators
of decedents' estates. The asserted purpose of the preference-
to conserve court time by limiting the number of potential ap-
pointees-was rejected by Chief Justice Burger, for a unanimous
Court, who stated that a state may not classify "on the basis of
criteria wholly unrelated" to the statute's "objective."''" Weber v.
154 A persistent problem of the modern welfare state, which a vigorous use of the
irrebuttable presumption doctrine can only aggravate, is the difficulty of conducting indi-
vidualized determinations on a large scale. This problem is under-assessed by those not
attuned to the difficulties of "mass justice" in administrative law. There is an unavoidable
tendency to transform personalized grievance procedures into thousands of formal
hearings-a powerful thrust toward over-legalization supported equally by "welfare rights"
groups and the American Bar Association. See generally R. DIXON, SOCIAL SECURITY
DISABILITY AND MASS JUSTICE: A PROBLEM IN WELFARE ADJUDICATION (1973); Mashaw, The
Management Side of Due Process: Some Theoretical and Litigation Notes on the Assurance of Accu-
racy, Fairness, and Timeliness in the Adjudication of Social Welfare Claims, 59 CORNELL L. REV.
772 (1974). See also D. BAUM, THE WELFARE FAMILY AND MASS ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE
(1974); Dixon, The Welfare State and MassJustice: A Warning From the Social Security Disability
Program, 1972 DUKE L.J. 681.
"'See notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra.
156 See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 508 (1975) (Stewart, J.); id. at 520 (dissent-
ing opinion, Brennan, J.).
'
57 See notes 55-65 and accompanying text supra.
' See Gunther, supra note 41, at 15.
159 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
160 Id. at 76.
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Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 16 1 invalidated the provisions of a
workmen's compensation statute under which unacknowledged il-
legitimate minors received nothing if there were enough legitimate
children to exhaust the maximum benefits. Writing for the Court,
Justice Powell did not choose between minimal rationality and strict
scrutiny, but seemed to reach for a new general rule which would
at least be more stringent than the old equal protection.1 62
Reed and Weber, however, could be read as strict scrutiny deci-
sions in disguise, with the Court treating the classifications involved
as "suspect" without actually saying so. A more general illustration
of a middle level, ends-means focused review, can be found in
Eisenstadt v. Baird.163 If the old Court had a 'josephic aversion to
women," 164 the new equal protection Court contains members, and
an occasional majority, with an aversion to legislative imperfection.
The Court in Eisenstadt, without applying strict scrutiny, utilized a
vigorous ends-means review to nullify a Massachusetts law forbid-
ding dissemination of birth control materials except by licensed
pharmacists or physicians. Certainly there were solid reasons for
questioning that kind of legislation, not the least being concern
about population control. But the Court did not cite the desirability
of birth control to justify its decision in Eisenstadt, nor did it draw
on the "privacy" rationale of Griswold v. Connecticut,165 which nul-
lified Connecticut's prohibition against the use of contraceptives.' 66
Instead, the majority insistently pursued legislative history, the
structure of the statute itself, apparent purposes of the legislation,
inexactness of means, and technical over- and under-inclusion, in
finding the legislative product wanting in rationality. Under the
statutory scheme, single persons, unlike married persons, could not
legally be given contraceptives, even on prescription, for the pur-
pose of preventing pregnancy. 67 On grounds of over- and under-
inclusion, the Court concluded that the married-unmarried distinc-
tion could not be sustained under any of three possible purposes:
deterring fornication, promoting health, 168 or prohibiting contra-
161 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
162 Id. at 172-75.
163 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
164 See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
165 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
166 The true issue in Griswold and in Eisenstadt, although not so handled by the Court,
may have been a first amendment right of access to birth control information. See Dixon,
The Griswold Penumbra: Constitutional Charter For an Expanded Law of Privacy?, 64 MIcH. L.
REv. 197, 213-17 (1965); Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MiCH. L. REV.
221 (1965).
167 Anyone could have obtained contraceptives to prevent disease. 405 U.S. at 442.
168 The purpose of deterring fornication fails because married persons with the aid of
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ception.16 9
Other cases followed,' 7 0 and by 1975 an overt ends-means
scrutiny test had taken more definite shape in such cases as
Schlesinger v. Ballard'7 ' and Weinberger v. Weisenfeld.172 In a 1976
case, Craig v. Boren,'173 the Court adopted the same analysis to
strike down a statutory scheme that discriminated against males. In
Weisenfeld, Justice Brennan spoke for a unanimous Court in strik-
ing down a provision of the Social Security Act which provided
survivor's benefits for widows but not for widowers. The Govern-
ment sought to justify the distinction on the ground that widows as
a group would find it harder than widowers to obtain work and
family income. The Court rejected this rationale, finding that the
actual statutory purpose was to benefit children by making it easier
for the surviving parent to remain in the home-a benefit not
uniquely related to the sex of the surviving parent.174 Weisenfeld, in
short, was a "no rationality" case.
A few weeks earlier the Court had decided Ballard, a more
difficult case illustrating the strains of middle level ends-means
scrutiny. The majority upheld Navy rules providing for mandatory
discharge after failure to achieve promotion, despite the fact that
the rules gave male officers a shorter period to make promotion
than female officers. Justice Stewart, for the Court, rationalized the
difference in terms of the more limited opportunity for promotion
contraceptives could engage in illicit relations with unmarrieds; the purpose of promoting
health fails because the unmarried need safeguards as well as the married. Id. at 447-52.
169 On the last point, Brennan said that even if Griswold were construed not to bar
prohibition of distributing contraceptives, a prohibition confined to unmarrieds would fail
for under-inclusion: "In each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical,
and the underinclusion would be invidious." Id. at 454.
17 0 See cases discussed in Gunther, supra note 41, at 10-20. See also Department of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973). The "strong rational basis" test has some affinity with the
"sliding scale" test articulated by Justice Marshall in his dissenting opinions in Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1
(1973). However, whereas the "strong rational basis" test points toward an ends-means
analysis, Marshall's "sliding scale" approach is directed more towards a weighing of the
interests in the case. In the end both approaches resemble substantive due process under a
new label.
171 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
172 420 U.S. 636 (1975).
,73 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
"4Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the result, said that the limitation at issue did "not
rationally serve any valid legislative purpose, including that for which [it] was obviously
designed." 420 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added). This suggests a willingness to continue the
"hypothesizing" approach of Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). In
Weisenfeld, however, there was a simple surviving parent-child care issue, the "sole ques-
tion" being "whether a child of a deceased contributing worker should have the opportu-
nity to receive the full-time attention of the only parent remaining." 420 U.S. at 655.
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available to women. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas
and Marshall, saw an unjustified gender-based classification. The
striking thing about the case is the detailed inquiry both wings of
the Court made into the legislative history and historical develop-
ment of the promotion systems as indicia of congressional purpose.
But whereas the majority Justices found "complete rationality,"'17 5
the dissenters accused them of sustaining the statute under "a sup-
position about the legislature's purpose in enacting it when the
asserted justification [could] be shown conclusively not to have un-
derlain the classification in any way.' 1 76 Although the merits of the
intra-Court debate in Ballard are not of concern here, one may well
ask whether invalidation of legislation on constitutional grounds
should turn on an inquiry into legislative purpose, when the Court
itself can split six to three as to the nature of the purpose.
In Craig, the Court struck down an Oklahoma statutory
scheme that prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer to all males under the
age of twenty-one and all females under the age of eighteen. 77
The state-armed with statistical evidence that substantially more
18-20 year-old males were arrested for driving while drunk or
under the influence than were females in the same age group-
argued that the gender-based classification was substantially related
to the legitimate state objective of promoting public health and
traffic safety. The Court, however, subjecting the statistical data to
a careful review, noted that the statute prohibited only the sale and
not the drinking of 3.2% beer, and concluded that the ends-means
relationship was far too tenuous to meet the Reed "substantial rela-
tionship" test.' 78
In a flurry of concurring and dissenting opinion, the Justices
indicated their own uncertainty about the equal protection stan-
dards to be applied in specific cases. Justice Brennan, writing for
the majority, embraced an ends-means, strong rational basis stan-
dard, at least for gender-based classifications.' 79 But in the various
175 419 U.S. 498, 509 (1975).
176 Id. at 520 (emphasis in original).
177 97 S. Ct. 451 (1976).
'1 Id. at 458-60.
179 Justice Brennan never explicitly discussed the level of equal protection review he
was applying to the challenged classification scheme. He indicated, however, that Reed was
controlling, and that the gender-based classification had to he substantially related to the
attainment of important governmental interests. Id. at 457-60. This is the language of a
strong rational basis test (middle-level review) falling between strict scrutiny and minimum
rationality. To the extent that the Court may already treat sex as a suspect classification
where females are disadvantaged (see note 58 and accompanying text supra), Craig repre-
sents an extension of such treatment to gender-based classifications that disadvantage
males.
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concurring and dissenting opinions, support was expressed for
one-level, 8 " two-level, 18' and three-level' 82 approaches to equal
protection review.
From the standpoint of constitutional history, the development
of equal protection review into a "three-tier plus" system makes life
more interesting for the judiciary, but adds nothing to the certainty
of the law. It may be explicable, however, in terms of internal
strains in the Court on questions of social, political, and moral
values.' 83 After the rejection of substantive due process, the Court
cast about for a substitute. For a time, strict scrutiny proved fully
adequate. It.was even better than due process, since it sounded in a
value nobody could fault-equality-and was almost automatic in
application. The earlier minimum rationality approach was con-
tinued for a variety of cases, e.g., where the problem of adjusting
resources to needs was great, 184 where the classification was so
intrinsically arbitrary that the Court hesitated to interfere with the
legislative choice, 8 5 or where the plaintiff's claim did not seem to
implicate any enduring values.' 86 The flaw in this two-tier system
1" Justice Stevens maintained that the Court has really been applying only one level of
equal protection analysis-requiring every state to govern impartially-and that all the de-
cided cases could be explained within that analysis. The Oklahoma statute, according to
Stevens, failed to meet the impartiality requirement, and was therefore unconstitutional. 97
S. Ct. at 464-65 (concurring opinion).
I'l Chief Justice Burger (dissenting), Justice Rehnquist (dissenting), and Justice Stewart
(concurring), although reaching different results, all applied the minimum rationality test
of the two-tier analysis. Id. at 466-73.
Justice Rehnquist, in perhaps the most carefully reasoned opinion, maintained that
application of the two-level analysis in equal protection cases had caused sufficient prob-
lems to render undesirable an even more daring three-level review. Id. at 467-69. Under
the two-level analysis, which he has taken some pains to clarify over the past several years,
Rehnquist would apply strict scrutiny only when a class discriminated against had been
historically subjected to a pattern of discrimination (e.g., female sex), or when a fundamen-
tal interest (e.g., individual interest in privacy) had been infringed. In all other cases-as in
Craig-a minimum rationality test would be applied. Id.
"'
2 Justice Powell, concurring, called on the Court to forthrightly acknowledge that it
had employed a middle-level review of gender-based classifications. Id. at 463-64.
113 That law, particularly constitutional law, is not an objective science is no secret. See
J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1975). Compare W. MENDEL.SON,
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (1961), udth Reich, Mr. Justice
Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. REV. 673 (1963). See also Dahl, Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957);
Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1968).
184 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
185 Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
8'8 See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (zoning for single-family
dwellings sustained; "family" defined to exclude unrelated groups of three or more); John-
son v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) ("active duty" requirement for veterans' benefits sus-
tained, thus excluding conscientious objectors who had performed alternative civilian ser-
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was that once the close similarity between strict scrutiny and sub-
stantive due process was perceived, the former became suspect and
had to be saved for the truly extraordinary case. Likewise the ir-
rebuttable presumption doctrine, which can accomplish some of
the same activist purposes as strict scrutiny, has become something
of an over-kill concept. From this perspective, middle level or
strong rational basis review can be viewed as a flexible mediating
principle, permitting judicial participation without dominance in
the shaping of public policy.
More important than the details of the strong rational basis
line of cases 181 is the overall spirit of judicial review which they
seem to embody. According to Gerald Gunther,18 8 the essence of
the strong rational basis test as a model for equal protection review
in the future can be phrased as follows: "[L]egislative means [i.e., the
classifications used] must substantially further legislative ends."'' 89
The Court will "concern itself solely with means, not with ends."' 90
By contrast, under the Warren Court's strict scrutiny test the
Court asked whether the "legislative ends were 'compelling' and
repeatedly found legislative purposes inadequate to justify im-
pingements on fundamental interests."'191 Under the middle-tier
review of Reed and Eisenstadt, and the more recent confirmations of
the trend in Ballard and Weisenfeld, the "yardstick for the accepta-
bility of the means would be the purposes chosen by the legisla-
tures, not 'constitutional' interests drawn from the value percep-
tions of the Justices.' 92
The strong rational basis test is somewhat inconsistent with the
realities of lawmaking. 193 Legislation is the product of a political
vice); Marshall v. United States, 414 U.S. 417 (1974) (exclusion from drug rehabilitation
programs of felons with two or more previous convictions sustained).
187 In view of the Court's reluctance in Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96
S. Ct. 2562 (1976)-not a sex-related case-to apply an ends-means analysis, the strong
rational basis test may turn out to be merely a gloss on the "two-tier" system for sex-related
classifications.
188See G. GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 662 & n.12 (9th
ed. 1975); Gunther, supra note 41. See generally Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court,
2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645 (1975); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, The Equal Protection
Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L. REv. 945 (1975).
189 Gunther, supra note 41, at 20.
190 Id. at 21.
191 Id.
192 Id.
193 For another recent criticism of the constitutional legitimacy of "ends-means" review,
whether smuggled into equal protection and reaching "classification" cases, or honestly
grounded on substantive due process and reaching all cases, see Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197 (1976). See also P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING-CASES AND MATERIALS (1975); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation
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process of compromise and adjustment. 94 Much statutory lan-
guage is designed not to clearly express an agreed upon "legislative
end," but to accommodate the conflicting interests of persons who
wish to place the area in question under some governmental con-
trol. A constitutional mandate, however, that legislative means
must substantially promote legislative ends-even if expressed as a
"minimum rationality test"-could force the nullification of many
enactments. It also could lead to tedious and uncertain inquiries
into confused legislative histories.1 95 Legislative purpose is primar-
ily relevant as an aid to statutory construction. The constitutionality of
legislation should not turn on the clarity of its purposes, or the
pleasing symmetry with which the means are tailored to further the
specified purposes. The constitutional focus should instead be on
the overall impact of the program on identifiable rights. Otherwise,
we shall have returned to Lochner v. New York,' 96 without the hon-
esty of Lochner.
Although recognizing its affinity with the substantive due pro-
cess approach of Lochner and of Nebbia v. New York, 197 Gunther sees
this new style of review as merely placing "a greater burden on the
state to come forth with explanations about the contributions of its
means to its ends.' 1 98 He asserts that "[m]eans scrutiny . . . can
improve the quality of the political process-without second-
guessing the substantive validity of its results-by encouraging a
fuller airing in the political arena of the grounds for legislative
action."'199 At this point Gunther's equal protection analysis inter-
sects with the suggestion of Professor Tribe, placed nominally un-
der the due process clause and called "structural due process. ' 200
in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970).
'9' See sources cited at note 16 supra.
19' As Justice Rehnquist explained, dissenting in another apparent strong rational basis
decision: "[C]ourtrooms should [not] become forums for a second round of legislative hear-
ings whenever a legislative determination is later challenged." Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628, 641 (1974).
196 198 U.S. 45 (1905). See note 87 supra.
197 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Gunther recognizes that his suggested means-focused model
of equal protection review, which calls for careful scrutiny of legislative classifications,
parallels both in purpose and in verbiage the formula of latter-day substantive due process
review as articulated in Nebbia. As phrased in Nebbia, the test was whether "the means
selected ... have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained." Id. at
525. The only function of the equal protection clause in this perspective is to provide a
more acceptable basis for reinstating this level of judicial review, because the correct label
of substantive due process has been so thoroughly discredited that it evokes an instinctive
negative response. See Gunther, supra note 41, at 41-43.
19' Gunther, supra note 41, at 44.
1 9 9 
Id.
2. Tribe, supra note 132.
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Tribe also has a concern for inadequacies in the political process,
particularly during "periods of moral flux."2 ' I He proposes a ju-
dicial power to invalidate laws enacted on the basis of outmoded,
simple stereotypes that make defective the "process of policy-for-
mation. ' 20 2 To him, the abortion decision, Roe v. Wade,2 0 3 "makes
the most sense if it is read as standing for the proposition that the
process of governmental determination of the legality of early abor-
tions had become so entangled with religion that the state was dis-
abled from legislating in the area. "204
It is apparent that an ends-means scrutiny, engrafted on equal
protection via the "strong rational basis" test, has a thrust similar to
the irrebuttable presumption doctrine previously discussed. Both
press toward governmental action by judicially-controlled indi-
vidualized hearings rather than by legislatively-enacted generalized
rules. The so-called "structural due process" analysis provides a
somewhat uncertain alternative rationale for this questionable
functional result of the "new" equal protection.
E. The Limits of New Equal Protection
Many of the developments under the "new" equal protection
are both unsettling to established practice and troubling for con-
stitutional theory. Whether approached in due process or equal
protection terms, the function of judicial review is not to make the
legislative process constitutional. It is that already, no matter how
fitful legislative policy-making might be. Nor is it the function of
the courts to "improve" the legislative product or make it more
rational. The proper function of judicial review in respect to the
legislative process is to prevent it from making unjustified inroads
on identifiable constitutional rights. A rigorous "ends-means" re-
view is analogous to the open-ended "arbitrary and capricious" or
"substantial evidence" standard customary in scrutinizing adminis-
trative action.2 0 5 We will erode the foundations of the separation of
powers and the proper limits of "constitutional review" if we let the
habits of review appropriate for administrative action extend to
legislative action too.
2 01 Id. at 319.
202 Id. at 290-93.
203 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
204 Tribe, supra note 132, at 290-9 1.
205 It is known among the legal congnoscenti that a court can do just about as it
pleases under such vague standards. See, e.g., K. DAvIS, 4 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§ 29.01, .02, .11 (1958). On the distinction between "constitutional review" and lesser
forms of review, see Strong, Judicial Review: A Tn-Dimensional Concept of Administrative-
Constitutional Law (pt. 2), 69 W. VA. L. REV. 249 (1967).
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More significantly, we should be wary of using equal protec-
tion as a hatchet in areas where generic equality is not present. The
equal protection clause has normally been seen as a check on the
most egregious forms of invidious discrimination. Indeed, that was
its exclusive original purpose, and should be its limiting principle
even when it is expanded beyond racial matters. 2116 It is important
to bear in mind the distinction between legislatively-created charac-
teristics established for regulatory purposes, and unchangeable
natural characteristics to which benefits or disabilities may be at-
tached. The equal protection clause was never intended to be an
instrument for general review of legislation under a rigid require-
ment that similarly situated persons be treated similarly.
III
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS AND
CURRENT RACIAL ISSUES
I have reserved until last the issues of school desegregation,
benign racial quotas, and reverse discrimination. Approaching the
"equality" topic in this way adds perspective, and helps to delineate
the breadth and uncertainty of the equal protection clause. The
clause itself expresses so little, yet incorporates such large hopes
and aspirations. Its meaning is even less illumined by our com-
mon-law heritage than the concept of due process.2117
The equal protection clause may operate to give the Court
unprincipled discretion, 2 8 when combined with a "right of travel"
206 Cf. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873) (holding that the equal
protection clause was clearly designed for a racial emergency, and that a strong case would
be needed for its application in any other context). The early post-Civil War Court was
willing to transcend race and reach economic regulation, but it was unable to find that any
equality values were implicated by the latter.
The modern era of equal protection for nonracial issues began with Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956), where the Court required the state to provide free trial transcripts to
indigent criminals where necessary for an appeal. But even there, was an equality value
actually involved or was it a due process value going to basic fairness in administration of
criminal justice? Justice Harlan, dissenting in Griffin, saw it as the latter. Id. at 35-36. The
majority saw it as the former, thus creating a constitutional right with no limiting principle
and logically extending free counsel to indigents even for discretionary appeals and post-
conviction relief. Subsequently, the majority did limit the right of free counsel to the first
appeal-as-of-right stage, although without a satisfying rationale. Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963). Justice Harlan on one occasion did muster a majority for his preferred
due process rationale. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S 371 (1971).
117 See E. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINsr GOVERNMENT 90-91, 114-15 (1948).
208 It also may operate to give the Court an uninformed power to play god with the
politics of the people, as it did in the latter phases of the reapportionment revolution. As a
federal district court in Texas explained in 1972: "In ten years of wandering about this
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concept as in Shapiro v. Thompson.' 9 There, by voiding all welfare
residence requirements, the Court effectively increased the welfare
burden of those states favored by migrants. There was not, and
could not be, any corresponding judicial guarantee of federal fi-
nancial assistance.2x" From the perspective of federalism, the Court
had power to complicate the problem, not to solve it. The Court
should be loath to use constitutional clauses that speak in terms of
individual rights to effect major institutional changes in govern-
ment,211 as, for example, it was loath to order equalization of school
expenditures in Rodriguez.2 t2
What then of race? Do we find here at least an area in which
the equal protection clause is plainly applicable within well-defined
limits? Have we found the "burning bush" of clear principle so that
all that is left is a bit of tidying up? Not only is the answer "no," but
we are mired in a major moral crisis as well as constitutional confu-
sion. As the late Professor Bickel saw it in his last book, The Morality
of Consent:
The lesson of the great decisions of the Supreme Court and
the lesson of contemporary history have been the same for at
least a generation: discrimination on the basis of race is illegal,
immoral, unconstitutional, inherently wrong, and destructive of
democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a
matter of whose ox is gored. Those for whom racial equality was
demanded are to be more equal than others. Having found sup-
political thicket, we have not yet found the burning bush of final explanation." Graves v.
Barnes, 343 F. Supp. 704, 708 (W.D. Tex. 1972), aff'd sub nom. Archer v. Smith, 409 U.S.
808 (1972), modified sub noain. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), vacated as moot, 422
U.S. 935 (1975).
This era was perhaps ended with Justice White's opinion for the Court in Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), establishing a prima facie rule of constitutionality if popu-
lation deviations among districts are minimal, and recognizing that all legislative districting
is political.
2,,9 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
21(3 When a Supreme Court decision forces the restructuring of government rather
than the satisfaction of particular personal claims, it may be possible for the government
body affected to engage in counter-restructuring, to the overall detriment of the groups in-
volved. Under a ruling such as Shapiro, it is possible for government to adjust to the new
burden by reducing the benefits for all claimants. See generally Canby, The Burger Court and
the Validity of Classifications in Social Legislation: Currents of Federalism, 1975 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1.
211 More helpful would be a concept of minimum levels of service or opportunity, but
as one writer has demonstrated, it is impossible to derive such a concept logically from the
equal protection clause. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting
the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969). Fine gradations
keyed to reasonableness, and to the adequacy of means to ends, sound in due process if at
all.
212 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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port in the Constitution for equality, they now claim support for
inequality under the same Constitution. Yet a racial quota dero-
gates the human dignity and individuality of all to whom it is
applied; it is invidious in principle as well as in practice.
Moreover, it can as easily be turned against those it purports to
help. The history of the racial quota is a history of subjugation,
not beneficence. Its evil lies not in its name but in its effect; a
quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes, and it is all the
worse for its racial base, especially in a society desperately striv-
ing for an equality that will make race irrelevant. 213
In an effort to draw together a number of disparate strands on
the current scene, I would like to suggest a tactical view of race, the
Supreme Court, and integration. My starting point is Brown v.
Board of Education,214 both a promise and a paradox in respect to
equality in America. It is a promise to blacks not so much of a place
in the sun, but of a chance for a daiquiri in the shade with the rest
of us. It is a paradox because not even in political philosophy, let
alone constitutional law, has the tension been resolved between the
goals of equality of opportunity and equality of results. 215 The
Court could have been content in Brown to jettison the "separate
but equal" doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson2' 1 6 by going back to the
earlier doctrine of Strauder v. West Virginia,217 i.e., that state ben-
efits and procedures may not be conditioned on race. We might
then have been able to approach the more subtle equality issues
incrementally rather than apocalyptically.
A. Desegregation
Brown, of course, nullified compulsory racial segregation in
public education. But Chief Justice Warren's short opinion for a
unanimous Court, even if written mainly for rhetorical effect to
muster support for desegregation, could be read to promise much
more. Education is "the most important function of state and local
governments, '' 218 said Warren, and in modern society "it is doubt-
213 A. BICKEL, supra note 56, at 133. Identical language appears in the Brief of the
Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae 36, De Funis v. Odegaard, 416
U.S. 312 (1974). Professor Bickel authored that brief in association with Professor Philip
B. Kurland, Larry M. Lavinsky, and Arnold Forster.
214 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
215 Parody sometimes illuminates conceptual difficulties better than the disputations of
philosophers. On equality of results, see the essay Harrison Bergeron in K. VONNEGUT,
WELCOME TO THE MONKEY HOUSE 7 (1950). On the distributive justice facet of equality
theory, see Michelman, supra note 211.
216 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
217 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
218 347 U.S. at 493.
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ful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life
if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportu-
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which
must be made available to all on equal terms. '219 Noting then-cur-
rent "psychological knowledge," the Chief Justice concluded
that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal. '' 22 ,
The purported psychological basis for such a concept of in-
herent inequality would appear to be present whether racial sep-
aration is the aftermath of prior de jure segregation, or the prod-
uct of current residential patterns. Is a Northern state therefore
culpable if, using the words of Brown, it "has undertaken to pro-
vide" the "opportunity of an education," but has not made it "avail-
able to all on equal terms" because it has done nothing to correct
the segregation resulting from residential patterns? Obviously
much of the Brown opinion rests on an ethic of minority assimila-
tion, with the public school as the generative force.221 The "melting
pot" ideal has long been one of America's cherished traditions,
and, despite some cynical attacks on it, has generally served us
well.222 The tragedy of the black ghetto child today is that he is
bused to improve readiness to compete with no assurance that
readiness will occur, 223 and under conditions that may initially
heighten barriers to assimilation. For though education is compul-
219 Id.
220 Id. at 494-95.
221 A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 121-23 (1970).
222 Although the melting pot has never been perfect, a great many groups have been
successfully assimilated. Orientals, for example, although early victims of discrimination,
were eventually integrated into the mainstream, with little adverse effect on their educa-
tional development.
223 Assessment of educational gains or losses among black and white students affected
by large-scale desegregation orders is beyond the scope of this Article. Findings conflict
and research methodology is disputed. Gains seem to be most likely in areas where the
following special conditions exist: little interracial hostility among students; specially
trained staff who understand and accept minority students; majority middle-upper class
students in each classroom; desegregation at both school and classroom levels; absence of
inflexible tracking; no interracial conflict in community over desegregation; and possibly
the involvement of younger children. Weinberg, The Relationship Between School Desegrega-
tion and Academic Achievement: A Review of the Research, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 241, 269
(1975). A community with these attributes may not need desegregation, and may be ready
for a relaxed free-choice student assignment system, except for the problem of finding
middle-upper class majorities in each classroom. If that appears to be the key variable, i.e.,
interclass mixture rather than interrace mixture, one must then ask how our earlier im-
migrant lower class schools differed, and how they apparently accomplished their mission.
There may be old lessons to be relearned. To make interclass mixture the chosen instru-
ment today is to embrace a long-term egalitarian policy of Maoist proportions. And that
policy is not even remotely extractable from Brown or any subsequent Supreme Court deci-
sion. See Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation
Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976).
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sory, the melting pot has always been voluntary. That voluntariness
was undergirded by a constitutional ruling of the Supreme Court
in the 1920's, nullifying an attempt to discourage parochial schools
by requiring public school attendance during part of the child's
educational development.224
Much of our present doctrinal confusion, therefore, stems
from Brown. The case arose in the context of compelled official
segregation, but the rehetoric of the opinion seems to reach all
segregation in the educational experience. The melting pot spirit,
which was especially appealing to Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Frankfurter, pervades the opinion. But there is serious question as
to whether a concept like the melting pot can retain its viability
once made compulsory. More to the point, is there any logical
stopping point short of a form of Chinese Cultural Revolution
when it is made compulsory? These unanswered questions emanat-
ing from Brown are not only with us, they haunt us.
1. The Private School Option
The private school has long been considered an enduring
force on the American scene, drawing strength from both freedom
and privacy values. As long as the private schools met the
minimum quality standards for compulsory education, the law had
no concern with their racial or religious composition. After Brown,
the private school2 25 option became a major vehicle for avoiding
the melting pot in various parts of the country, and for defeating
the integrative effect of judicial desegregation orders. In 1976, how-
ever, a divided Court ruled in Runyon v. McCray226 that a nonsec-
tarian private elementary school could not refuse to admit a black
pupil. The decision was nominally227 based on the Civil Rights Act
224 Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
225 It could be argued that the special "segregation academies" which arose in response
to Brown were not, like the conventional "private schools," analogous to private clubs, but
were more like places of public accommodation, open to all except blacks. Functionally the
argument has apppal. Practically it would call for some close line-drawing because many
pre-Brown private schools were not exclusive. And to extend the public accommodation
theory of Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), to the "seg academies" would have
required a bit more stretching of the commerce clause.
226 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976), aff'g 515 F.2d 1082 (4th Cir. 1975). Four Justices sharply
criticized the majority's legal theory. See note 231 infra.
For a narrowly distinguished contrary ruling, see Riley v. Adirondack S. Sch. for Girls,
368 F. Supp. 392 (M.D. Fla. 1973), decision on appeal deferred, 522 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1975),
in which the court left undisturbed an all-white private school because an objective test was
given to all applicants, and factors other than race were considered in the admissions pro-
cess.
27 Operationally the real issue in McCrary, although not overfy so treated by the
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of 1866,228 which had been enacted pursuant to the enabling clause
of the thirteenth amendment with the aim of protecting the right
of freed blacks to make contracts and deal in property.229 Since
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. 230 in 1968, the Court has been engaged
in rewriting this statute, and thus the thirteenth amendment as
well, in order to support broader application of its provisions. This
process was continued in McCrary.
The thrust of Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in
McCrary is the same as in his opinion in Jones: namely, that the
thirteenth amendment conferred on Congress not merely a power
to eradicate involuntary servitude, but also a broad police power
over black status and opportunity in general. 23' Thus, according to
Court, may have been a need to protect the desegregation process against a drain of whites
to private schools. Such an approach would have placed the ruling on grounds of remedy
(i.e., it would be a protective order) rather than right, analogous to the rationale of South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), sustaining the "temporary" federal takeover
of voter registration under the Voting Rights Act. However, proof of a significant adverse
impact on desegregation orders might not be easy. The dissenting judges at the court of
appeals noted that only 7.6% of secondary school students attended private schools, and
only 13.4% of all students, nursery through college, attended private schools. McCrary v.
Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1096 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2586 (1976). Furthermore,
the Supreme Court in McCrary ruled only that private schools cannot reject blacks solely on
the basis of race, not that the schools must cease operation. In any event, it is doubtful that
a sufficient number of blacks can afford to enroll in private schools to cause a significant
flow of white students back to the public schools.
228 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970).
229 The statute provides that "[a]ll persons" shall have the same right "to make and
enforce contracts ... as is enjoyed by white citizens." 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970) (derived
from Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27). The parallel provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1970), protects the right to deal in property. To be valid in the McCrary context, § 1981
must be linked to the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. See Note, Federal Power to
Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era
Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Section
1981 as an Alternative to State Action, 62 GEO. L.J. 1363 (1974); Note,Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer
Co. Extended to Private Education: Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 122 U. PA. L. REv.
471 (1973).
230 392 U.S. 409 (1968). The majority in Jones held that the thirteenth amendments
prohibition of involuntary servitude also reached "badges of slavery," and treated the re-
fusal of a housing developer to sell a unit to a black as such a "badge." Id. at 439, 441-43.
See generally Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth Amendment
(pts. 1-9), 12 Hous. L. REV. 1, 331, 357, 593, 610, 844, 871, 1070 (1974-75), and 13 Hous.
L. REV. 63 (1975); Casper, Jones v. Mayer: Clio, Bemused and Confused Muse, 1968 Sup. CT.
REv. 89; Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L.
REV. 63, 82-87 (1968).
231 96 S. Ct. at 2598. Dissenting Justices White and Rehnquist (id. at 2604) and concur-
ring Justices Powell (id. at 2601) and Stevens (id. at 2603) thought the whole line of sup-
porting precedent was wrong, but the latter two felt bound by the error in Jones. Following
precedent does support stability of law, but Justice Stevens' additional point, that the Jones
error accorded with "the prevailing sense of justice today," (96 S. Ct. at 2604), is question-
able, both as a principle of constitutional interpretation and as an accurate assessment of
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Stewart, the "contract" and "property" terms in the ancient 1866
Act should be expansively construed to bar virtually all private
discrimination, so that "a dollar in the hands of a Negro will
purchase the same thing as a dollar in the hands of a white
man."23 2 In McCrary,233 however, there were important counter-
vailing values to deal with: claims of freedom of association, paren-
tal rights, and the right of privacy. In Justice Stewart's brief discus-
sion of these claims, the parental and privacy rights were essentially
subsumed under the discussion of freedom of association. Justice
Stewart "assumed" a first amendment parental right to send chil-
dren to schools espousing the principle of racial segregation, but
made the right an empty one by ruling that "the practice of exclud-
ing racial minorities from such institutions is [not] protected by the
same principle. 234
The private school at issue in McCrary was not a sectarian,
parochial school. But the principle of parental freedom "to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control,"
including choice of a private school, which the Court upheld in
1925 in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,235 is not restricted to choosing a
parochial school. Pierce was a due process-liberty case, not a first
amendment freedom of religion case. There is therefore an im-
plicit tension between the ruling in Pierce and the new McCrary
ruling, for the latter materially limits the principle of parental
freedom.236 It is a potential conflict between the liberty protected
by the fourteenth amendment and the special-perhaps even sui
the "current" sense of justice. It is unlikely that Congress would pass, or the President
would sign, a measure to accomplish the result mandated by McCrary.
232 96 S. Ct. at 2598, quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
233 In another significant race discrimination case at the end of the 1975 Term,
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 96 S. Ct. 2574 (1976), the Court reversed two
lower courts that had permitted the discharge of two white employees concurrent with the
retention of a black employee equally involved in alleged thievery. The Court held such
discrimination to be illegal under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (and also under
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970))).
234 96 S. CL at 2596 (emphasis in original).
235 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
236 In his Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Runyon v. McCrary, 96 S.
Ct. 2586 (1976), the Solicitor General sought to meet this point, stating that "[t]o the extent
that freedom to associate is also an ingredient of the due process holdings of such cases as
Pierce v. Society of Sisters . . . no such associational interest would be impaired by the appli-
cation of Section 1981 here (which would not prevent any individuals from associating in private
schools)." Id. at 31 n.30 (emphasis added). But the application would prevent association on
certain bases desired by the associators. It is acceptable to say that for overriding reasons of
national policy certain kinds of association, even if noncriminal, must be curbed. It is unac-
ceptable to play with words and deny that a curb is a curb. The same criticism may be
made of Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court in McCrary.
1977]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
generis-black rights derived from the thirteenth amendment.237
2. "White Flight," The City Boundary Issue
An even greater obstacle to desegregation than the existence
of private schools has been the phenomenon of massive "white
flight." Although not solely a reaction to desegregation orders, the
migration of whites to suburbia is producing heavily black central
cities and heavily white suburbs. 238 Court-ordered remedies for
official segregation were extended to Northern cities in the wake of
Keyes v. School District No. 1239 in 1973, but the option of escaping
remedial orders (such as busing) by moving to the suburbs was
kept open one year later in Milliken v. Bradley,240 where the Court
reversed a lower court ruling mandating metropolitan area busing
in Detroit. After finding that official segregation had existed in the
Detroit city public school system, the district court devised an
areawide busing plan, encompassing Detroit and surrounding sub-
urbs, because of an insufficiency of whites in the city proper.241
The Supreme Court's reversal was not on the ground that
interdistrict compulsory integration orders were always forbid-
den, 242 but on the ground that they were permissible only if the
taint of prior illegality affected the entire area, not merely one part
of it. Some lower court decisions on interdistrict busing since
Milliken, based on such proof, have ordered crossing of lines,
243
237 The tensions between the judicially remade thirteenth amendment and various
facets of the fourteenth amendment are provocatively discussed in Note, The "New" Thir-
teenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1294, 1312-13 (1969).
23 See W. TAYLOR, HANGING TOGETHER: EQUALITY IN AN URBAN NATION 169-72
(1971). Taylor cites data indicating that by 1985 three of every four blacks in metropolitan
areas will live in the central city, and seven of every ten whites in the suburbs.
239 413 U.S. 189 (1973). See United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975)
(Omaha); Hart v. Community Sch. Bd., 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975) (New York City); Mor-
gan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975) (Boston);
Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974) (Kalamazoo); United
States v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68 (7th Cir. 1974) (Indianapolis).
240 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
2"I See id. at 728-36.
2 42 Id. at 744-45. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16
(1971). Milliken also involved a "little federalism" problem, which may help to explain the
reversal. A plaintiff victory would have pointed toward state control of educational district-
ing, just as plaintiff victory in Rodriguez would have forced state control of local educational
expenditure. See text accompanying notes 69 & 96 supra. Taken together, Rodriguez and
Milliken may evidence a Supreme Court distaste for use of the equal protection principle to
force a restructuring of government-apart from the area of legislative apportionment.
M See, e.g., United States v. Missouri, 515 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
951 (1975); Newburg Area Council v. Board of Educ., 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 931 (1975); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd, 423 U.S. 963
(1975), implemented, 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976). In Tasby v. Estes, 517 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.),
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and, to date, the Supreme Court has indicated a distaste for
further involvement in this highly charged issue by its summary
actions denying review or affirming.2 44
Indeed, the 1976 decision in the Chicago Housing Authority
case, Hills v. Gautreaux,245 evidences a concern by the Court to
preserve the autonomy of "innocent" local governments who have
not themselves been party to constitutional violations by other gov-
ernments. The suit was designed to promote location of federally-
subsidized housing in the suburbs. 246 In upholding a court of ap-
peals decision against the federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD), the Supreme Court stressed the vari-
ous actions that HUD could take on its own, and stated that the
remedial decree would not force surburban governments to submit
public housing proposals to HUD or displace their customary
powers under existing law.247
3. Problems of "Right" and "Remedy" Under Brown
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education248 in 1970,
and again by inference in 1974 in Milliken v. Bradley,249 the Su-
preme Court endorsed the basic theory that the Constitution does
not compel or confer any substantive right to racial integration in
public schools. Rather, despite some broader rhetoric in Brown as
noted above, 2511 the Constitution forbids official acts of racial seg-
regation. Once official segregation has occurred, it is necessary as a
matter of remedy to issue temporary "integration orders." Sup-
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 939 (1975), the Court followed the principle but did not find the requi-
site proof.
244 See cases cited in note 243 supra. On remand in Buchanan v. Evans, 423 U.S. 963
(1975), aff'g 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), the district court subsequently directed the
preparation of an interdistrict plan (Wilmington, Del., and suburbs), the city being 90%
black or Chicano and the suburbs being 90% white. 416 F. Supp. 328 (D. Del. 1976). See
also Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation in the Wake of Milliken-On Losing Big Battles and Win-
ning Small Wars: The View Largely From Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535 (1975).
245 425 U.S. 284 (1976), aff'g Gautreaux v. Chicago Hous. Auth., 503 F.2d 930 (7th
Cir. 1975).
248 In one significant respect Gautreaux is quite different from the school desegregation
cases in its impact on individuals. Public housing projects involve no compulsion affecting
individuals as do integration orders in education.
247 425 U.S. at 300-06. See Kushner & Werner, Metropolitan Desegregation After Milliken
v. Bradley: The Case for Land Use Litigation Strategies, 24 CATH. U.L. REv. 187 (1975);
Rubinowitz & Dennis, School Desegregation Versus Public Housing Desegregation: The Local Dis-
trict and the Metropolitan Housing District, 10 URB. L. ANN. 145 (1975); Note, Interdistrict
Desegregation: The Remaining Options, 28 STAN. L. REv. 521 (1976).
248 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
249 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See Desegregating Urban School Systems After Milliken v. Bradley
(Symposium), 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751, 751-850 (1975).
2'o See notes 218-24 and accompanying text supra.
19771
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
posedly, such orders are to be effective only long enough to eradi-
cate the "vestiges" 5' a of the state-imposed dual system and yield a
unitary system, at which point the federal district court's monitor-
ing function will cease.
The rhetoric of Brown and later cases has served to cloud the
supposed distinction between right and remedy in desegregation.
In cases where the prior existence of an officially segregated school
system has been conceded, the Court has not minced words in
ordering broad remedial actions. In Green v. County School Board,2 5 2
the Court stated that there was an affirmative duty for school
boards to take all necessary steps to achieve a "system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch. ' 253 In
Swann the Court approved a detailed plan of altered attendance
zones and busing to achieve a high degree of racial proportionality
in the schools. In a companion case to Swann, the Court made the
following statement, which was subsequently relied on in the Bos-
ton school desegregation case: "Having once found a violation, the
district judge or school authorities should make every effort to
achieve the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation, taking
into account the practicalities of the situation .... The measure of
any desegregation plan is its effectiveness. '254 It would appear
from such language that the question of how much of the racial
separation in a particular case is attributable to policies of official
separation, and how much to demographic patterns and residen-
tial preferences in the intervening years, is irrelevant to the Court.
But if that be so, and if demographic patterns keep shifting so as
to maintain substantial racial separation even in the face of the new
policies of the sort approved in Swann, what meaning remains in
the official theory that integration in the sense of compelled racial
mixing is not a matter of right but of remedy? Does all this render
meaningless the concurrent statement in Swann that there are
limits to desegregation orders, and that the objective is simply to
"dismantle dual school systems"? 255 Does the remedy, focusing on
the demonstrated fact of racial separation and ignoring its cause,
sub silentio reshape the remedy into a substantive right to integra-
tion?
251 Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). In Milliken
v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 738 (1974), the Court also reiterated the statement from Swann
that courts may impose desegregation plans "only on the basis of a constitutional violation,"
and that the nature of the violation conditions the "scope of the remedy."
252 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
5I Id. at 438.
2-4 Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
255
Id. at 22.
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There are aspects of Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court
in Keyes v. School District No. 1256 which seem to suggest an affirma-
tive answer, particularly in that part of the opinion dealing with the
question of how a constitutional violation can be shown even where
there has been no showing of dejure segregation. Justice Brennan
noted a "profound reciprocal effect"257 between a school board's
policies in selecting school sites and the movement of families that
determines the racial composition of neighborhoods. School board
actions, plus this private response, may have the effect of "ear-
marking schools according to their racial composition. ' 258 Justice
Brennan's approach in Keyes amounted to utilizing the remedy
language of Swann to justify a finding of an initial constitutional
violation in Denver. But "effect" goes both ways, and white flight
may neutralize integrative site selection. Given this reality of the
"reciprocal relationship," to base a finding of constitutional viola-
tion on such perpetual "earmarking" of schools is to trigger the
process of "remedial" integration orders on far less than conven-
tional de jure segregation. Indeed, it would seem to trigger sub
silentio a prophylactic integration duty, even in the face of wholly
private neighborhood obstacles, in order to avert any inference of
"constitutional violation." In effect, this makes integration an end
in itself.
The oddly bifurcated separate opinion by Justice Powell in
Keyes carried forward the question of what is, or should be, the
real meaning of Brown. At the outset of his opinion, Powell de-
parted from Brown's focus on ending official segregation and its
after-effects, and seemed to endorse a policy of racial mixture as
a constitutional right per se. He stated that "the evil of operating
separate schools [was] no less in Denver than in Atlanta ' 25 9
("separate" apparently referring to the fact of racial separation,
whether caused by private choice or by unconstitutional state ac-
tion). On the crucial question of the nature of the constitutional
violation that will trigger integration remedies, Powell suggested a
less demanding test than the majority's requirement of showing
"segregative intent 26° behind the school board's policies.
Whenever disproportionate racial ratios in schools could be
shown, he would put the burden on school boards to show that
they "nevertheless are operating a genuinely integrated school
256 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
5 7 Id. at 202.
258 Id.
219 Id. at 219 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
2611 Id. at 206.
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But when Justice Powell proceeded to discuss remedy, a
strange thing happened. In contrast to the general pattern of de-
segregation litigation where concern for the remedy has enlarged
the right, the Powell opinion limited the right by considerations
drawn from analysis of remedy. Both the majority and Powell
suggested that proof of existence of all-black or all-white schools
would be strong evidence that the whole system was tainted, re-
quiring an extensive desegregation order. But Powell turned
the theory around and argued that one-race schools might be con-
stitutional if the entire system was genuinely integrated. Reverting
to his basic thought that the dominant cause of racial separation in
schools was residential separation, he found that the remedy of
mass busing exceeded the breadth necessary "to redress the con-
stitutional evil."'2 62 It is clear that by "constitutional evil" he meant
that parti of racial separation in the schools actually attributable to
wrongful school board action. This brought Powell, without ex-
plicit recognition of the point, back almost to the de jure approach
of Brown, with remedial power keyed to eliminating the after-ef-
fects of proven state-imposed segregation..2 63 In short, Powell
would apparently require a finding of school board involvement
in segregation before allowing court intervention. Where state-
imposed segregation was found, an analysis of official cause and
racial separation effect would determine the scope of the remedy.
To the extent this is a fair characterization, Powell in Keyes was
closer to Justice Rehnquist than to the majority opinion. Rehnquist
stressed a cause and effect approach to defining the scope of the
remedy, with the purpose of correcting situations where school
board manipulative techniques forced minority students "to attend
schools other than those that they would have attended had atten-
dance zones been neutrally drawn. 12 64
4. What Is Desegregation?
These critical ambiguities regarding the nature of the constitu-
tional violation involved in school "segregation," and the proper
261 Id. at 224.
262 Id. at 249.
263 Powell added that we should be especially concerned about overbreadth in the re-
medial phase of desegregation because the "burden" of the governmental restructuring
order is "borne by children and parents who did not participate in any constitutional viola-
tion." Id. at 249-50. In derogation of this principle, see the highly questionable extremism
of the First Circuit in the Boston busing case, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (Ist Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 743 (1977).
264 413 U.S. at 254 (dissenting opinion).
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scope and duration of remedy, surfaced again last term in Pasa-
dena Board of Education v. Spangler,265 a case that could mark a
turning point in the evolution of desegregation theory under the
equal protection clause. Nominally Pasadena only concerns dura-
tion of remedy, but impliedly it also raises the basic question of
what constitutes the right.
Pasadena is the first instance in which the Court found, in
effect, that the transition from an unlawfully segregated system to
a unitary system had been completed, even in the face of continued
racial separation due to shifting residential patterns. Pasadena be-
came subject to a remedial integration order in 1970 and decided
to comply rather than appeal. In 1974, because of changing resi-
dential patterns ("white flight"), the city sought modification of a
requirement in the desegregation decree that there be no majority
of minority students in any school. The case eventually reached the
Supreme Court, which rejected with astonishment the statement of
the federal district judge that, despite the school board's total com-
pliance on student placement, his desegregation order "'meant to
me that at least during my lifetime there would be no majority of
any minority in any school in Pasadena.' "266 In an opinion by Jus-
tice Rehnquist, the Court reiterated its pronouncement from
Swann that Brown does not require perpetual racial balance:
It does not follow that communities served by [unitary] systems
will remain demographically stable, for in a growing, mobile so-
ciety, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts
are constitutionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of
the racial composition of student bodies once the affirmative
duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimina-
tion through official action is eliminated from the system. 2 67
Equally significant-and on this point Justices Marshall and
265 96 S. Ct 2697 (1976). The Pasadena ruling was reinforced two days later by the
Court's denial of certiorari in a Sixth Circuit case, where the court of appeals had declared
that the City of Chattanooga had complied with its remedial desegregation duties by im-
plementing a court-approved racial mixing plan, even though immediate and substantial
white flight prevented the plan from achieving the anticipated racial mix. Mapp v. Board
of Educ., 527 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 3199 (1976).
See also Davis v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 398 F. Supp. 1013 (M.D. La.
1975), in which, after 20 years of litigation, the district court declared that a unitary system
had come into existence in East Baton Rouge, Louisiana, even though the then-current
housing patterns produced 22 single-race schools (2 white, 20 black) out of 108.
266 96 S. Ct. at 2703. The Court also chided the Ninth Circuit for merely frowning at
the district judge and not ordering correction of the error, so that the Board of Education
could know the scope of its duties and avoid any contempt of court action. 96 S. Ct. at 2706.
267 96 S. Ct. at 2704, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 31-32.
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Brennan disagreed-the Court held that the board was entitled to
a modifying order and perhaps termination of court jurisdiction
over its demographic attendance patterns, even though the board
had apparently not yet achieved total compliance with part of the
desegregation plan concerning hiring and promotion of teachers
and administrators. In short, a system can become "unitary" in
some respects, and be discharged from court supervision over
those aspects, even though some parts of the desegregation plan
are still being implemented, provided the parts are separable and
not causally connected. Specifically, in the context of Pasadena, at-
tendance patterns were deemed separable from affirmative action
duties in respect to staff.268
Because of its special setting, Pasadena does not resolve all
questions concerning the scope and duration of desegregation
remedies. If busing is the major desegregation tool in a given
school system, must busing be maintained indefinitely, or need it
be maintained only so long as it "works" to maintain the initial
amount of racial mixing it produced? In Pasadena, the plan was
initially successful 'in eliminating black-majority schools, but it
failed after the first year because of demographic shifts beyond the
city's control. Suppose that on remand of the Pasadena case, the
district judge lifted his order entirely (as the Solicitor General in
oral argument suggested might be appropriate).2 69 Could the city
then totally abandon the cross-town busing plan, or could it aban-
don the plan only to the extent that doing so would not increase the
racial imbalance that natural forces of population mobility were
causing anyway?
This question bridges right and remedy because it really de-
mands a definition of "desegregation" in a particular, realistic set-
ting. Ever since Brown, the tendency has been to stress that "it"
must be done quickly and effectively, without defining the "it. '270
6' A special feature of the Pasadena case was that the city could not have complied
easily with the illegal prescription of the federal district court judge even if it had tried.
"White flight," whether or not primarily attributable to the order itself, reduced the
Anglo-Caucasian student population from 58.3% in the first year of the court's order (i.e.,
1970, when full compliance with the attendance part of the order was achieved), to 44% in
the third year, yielding a black student population of 40%. Spangler v. Pasadena Bd. of
Educ., 519 F.2d 430, 433 n.3, 435 (9th Cir. 1975). Hence, with respect to the black minor-
ity, there would have been only a 4% margin to work with in fine tuning the busing
system; and when that margin vanished, compliance with the order would be a complete
impossibility.
269 96 S. Ct. at 2707.
2I I am reminded of an oral argument in Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ.,
396 U.S. 19 (1969), when the first Nixon Administration was arguing through Jerris
Leonard, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, that additional time should be
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Certainly, more than twenty years after Brown, an adequate defini-
tion should at least attempt to separate those aspects of ethnic
proportionality in schools-or in other aspects of life-attributable
to what Justice Powell has called "purely natural and neutral non-
state causes,"2 ' from those aspects attributable to governmental
manipulation. Although greeted with less than universal acclaim,
and though not without some troublesome features, the busing bill
proposed by President Ford in the summer of 1976 did saliently
raise this question. The core of the proposal was to require federal
courts in desegregation cases to determine the extent to which
discriminatory governmental action had caused more racial imbal-
ance than would have occurred anyway, and to limit remedial bus-
ing orders to correction of that portion of racial imbalance gov-
ernmentally induced. 27 2
There is more than a symbiotic relationship between the find-
ing (and definition) of a constitutional violation, and the shaping of
an affirmative action remedy. The scope and duration of judicial
allowed to Mississippi and other Fifth Circuit states to implement large-scale desegregation
plans. To Mr. Leonard's lame explanations, Justice Black, age 83, but practically bounding
on the Bench like a frustrated 60-year-old, kept insisting--"Why can't you do 'it' now?" But
it was obvious that Justice Black had not thought it through and had no notion of what "it"
was or when "it" would or could be accomplished.
271 Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 249 (concurring and dissenting opinion).
272 S. 3618, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (School Desegregation Standards and Assis-
tance Act of 1976). The NAACP had sharply criticized the proposal, but William Rasp-
berry, Washington Post columnist, had this to say in a column titled Busing and the NAACP:
The principal residual from the massive effort [of the NAACP to achieve racial
balance in all classrooms] is more likely to be racial bitterness and educational
deterioration than racial understanding and educational enhancement. This is so
because the emphasis on getting black children into the proper classrooms is based
on the assumption that race relations and education will automatically improve
once we [get] the children together. It's not automatic, and nobody seems to be
working very hard on it.
I put the onus on the NAACP rather than the courts because the courts have
no choice, once state-caused segregation is demonstrated, but to order desegrega-
tion....
But the NAACP has some choices. It could fight the unlawful official acts
that, in its view, produce segregation at the time the acts are committed. It could
involve itself directly in the search for ways to enhance the education of poor
blacks-a major national problem and one that isn't significantly affected even by
"successful" busing programs.
Washington Post, June 30, 1976, § A, at 19, col. 5.
See Rotunda, Congressional Power to Restrict the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts and
the Problem of School Busing, 64 GEO. L.J. 839 (1976). Rotunda argues against congressional
measures to limit busing on the ground that Congress cannot use a jurisdictional limitation
to restrict a substantive right, but he overlooks the element of overbreadth in the mass
busing remedy, and the obvious point that there is no constitutional right to remedial
overbreadth.
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jurisdiction over the school system is being determined. If the basis
for judicial intervention is a finding of some discriminatory action
attributable to government, then it follows that the remedy is
limited to "correcting" the effects of that constitutional violation.
But if judicial intervention is based solely on a statistical racial
imbalance that creates a presumption 273 of discriminatory state ac-
tion-even though the primary cause may be private action-then
judicial power would seem to be limited only by the dynamics of
demography and judicial self-restraint (which may be little limit
at all). Further, if a reasonably precise de jure-de facto distinction
is abandoned, we will have abandoned also the time limitation
on all integrative remedies, implicit in Brown, and will have taken
a long step toward the concept of an ethnically proportionalized
educational system, readjusted every year to maintain numerical
consistency in the face of contrary private choice.
Pasadena, with its focus on specific "correction" of specific gov-
ernmental discrimination, seems to point in the direction of a
limited judicial role, but a far better dialogue on the question is
needed.2 74 Until the Court clarifies the nature of the substantive
2"3 The presumption may be irrebuttable in practice, if not in law. Justice Powell noted
the difficulty in ascertaining school board motivation regarding years of administrative de-
cisions in a large and complex school system. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at
233-35 (concurring and dissenting opinion). See also Goodman, De Facto School Segregation:
A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 275 (1972). The traditional de
jure-de facto distinction in school desegregation is expressly supported in dicta in Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
274 Continuing its trend toward limiting remedies for school segregation to the effects
of the specific constitutional violations, the Supreme Court in Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
United States, 97 S. CL 517 (1976), remanded to the Fifth Circuit a sweeping remedial
school busing plan for reconsideration in light of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976)
(plaintiffs in civil rights cases must prove racially discriminatory purpose on part of offi-
cials and may not rely merely on a disproportionate racial impact). Noting that under the
Fifth Circuit's proposal any school falling outside of the "naturally desegregated" range
(between 50% and 90% Anglo) would be brought under the busing plan, Justice Powell
concluded in a concurring opinion that "the plan is designed to achieve some predeter-
mined racial and ethnic balance in the schools rather than to remedy the constitutional
violations committed by the school authorities. As described by the Court of Appeals, the
plan is impermissible under our holding [in] Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler
." 97 S. Ct. at 518 n.3.
Although the Court once again failed to clearly define those official actions and inac-
tions which amount to a constitutional violation and trigger equitable relief, Powell stated
that school authorities could not be held responsible for racial and ethnic imbalances in
public schools which resulted from residential patterns. He concluded that unless evidence
in the record indicated that "absent those constitutional violations, the Austin school system
would have been integrated to the extent contemplated by the plan, the remedy was over-
broad. Id. at 519.
This decision is likely to require a reconsideration of broad court desegregation orders
in effect in Wilmington, Delaware; Indianapolis, Indiana; Dayton, Ohio; and Louisville,
Kentucky. See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Delaware State Bd.
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right created by Brown, and the critical role of presumptions in
findings of discriminatory state action, we seem destined to remain
confused and divided-all the while slipping closer to the concept
of racial ratios as a permanent policy. And we will leave it to some
future generation to relearn the lesson that the ultimate goal is an
"equality that will make race irrelevant. '215 The purposes and goals
of "desegregation" are laudable. But continuing animosities gener-
ated by busing,27 6 and a new wave of revisionist criticism in civil
rights circles, 27 7 suggest that Supreme Court efforts to massively
restructure the American educational system are both risky and
unlikely to succeed.278 This seems especially true where the Court's
actions are based on little more than the constitutional uncertain-
ties of the equal protection clause and the philosophical uncertain-
ties of equality itself.
B. Racial Preferences--"Reverse Discrimination"
A somewhat different range of issues is presented when we
turn from school desegregation to racial preference policies volun-
of Educ. v. Evans, 97 S. Ct. 475 (1976) (dismissing appeal); Brief for the United States on
Petition for a Writ of Cert. to the U.S. Ct. of Appeals for the 5th Cir., Austin Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. United States, 97 S. Ct. 517 (1976) (granting certiorari, vacating, and remanding).
275 A. BICKEL, supra note 56, at 133.
276 The Boston desegregation case, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 743 (1977), has become a new Boston Marathon, and "[w]hites and
blacks each patrol the perimeters of their own neighborhoods in radio cars." N.Y. Times,
May 23, 1976, § 4, at 2, cols. 3-5. Between 1972 and 1976, under the district court's deseg-
regation plan, white enrollment dropped from 58,800 to 35,200, while black enrollment
remained at 31,000. N.Y. Times, June 28, 1976, at 61, col. 5.
277 Despite broad application of the fourteenth amendment, it is becoming increasingly
apparent that massive desegregation orders (as opposed to narrowly targeted desegrega-
tion orders keyed to clear cases of de jure segregation) are unworkable, both demographi-
cally and logistically, no matter how determined the school broad, and how vigorous the
judge. Writing in 1970, Alexander Bickel surveyed the problems and saw Brown v. Board
of Education headed for "irrelevance." A. BICKEL, supra note 221, at 151 (1970). More
recently Professor Derrick A. Bell, Jr., viewed Brown as obsolete, and wrote that the "time
has come for civil rights lawyers to end their single-minded commitment to racial balance,"
which is increasingly unattainable and .often "educationally impotent," and to work instead
for 'Judicially enforceable educational improvements which all parents seek." Bell, supra
note 223, at 516.
Professor James S. Coleman, co-author of the famous report, Equality of Educational
Opportunity (U.S. Gov't Printing Office 1966), has more recently concluded that the "cur-
rent means by which schools are being desegregated are intensifying the problems [of
central city-suburb segregation] rather than reducing it." See J. Coleman, S. Kelly & J.
Moore, Trends in School Segregation, 1968-73 (Urban Institute Paper Aug. 15, 1975). See
also C. JENcKS, INEQUALITY (1972); Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts: The Role of
Social Science Evidence, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 217 (1975); Sowell, Black Excellence: The
Case of Dunbar High School, 35 PUB. INTEREST 3 (1974).
"'
8 See generally Symposium on The Courts, Social Science and School Desegregation, 39 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 217 (1975).
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tarily adopted by government. Such policies have been developed
for public and private employment and for admissions to state
professional schools, in order to ensure an infusion of minority
group members who might not be employed or admitted under
conventional standards. Here, the problem is not one of judicial
dictation of constitutional duties to the political branches. Rather,
the political branches have presumably made a public policy choice
favoring special preferences for minorities. The question is
whether the judiciary should negate this policy choice on the
ground that minority preference programs violate the equal pro-
tection clause.2 79
Benevolent quotas or reverse discrimination in professional
school admissions and employment place important nondiscrimina-
tion and equality values in conflict. Although our goal should not
be a racially proportionalized society, preferential admissions and
employment policies are door-opening measures designed to
ameliorate the disadvantages stemming from racial isolation, and
to promote tolerance through mutuality of work and experience.
The concept of subsidies is not new to this generation, and has not
been confined to claims having a racial basis.280
79 This section deals with public policies of race preference, and judicial review
thereof. Theoretically, wholly private law schools and medical schools are not affected by
those constitutional restraints which may be imposed on public institutions that employ
reverse discrimination policies. However, the truly private nature of reverse discrimination
decisions in private schools may be questionable in light of the affirmative action duties
which descend on them as a condition for retaining federal funding or charitable group
tax privileges.
280 A full treatment of racial preference issues would encompass a number of federal
affirmative action policies. For example, every President since Franklin Roosevelt has exer-
cised authority to require government contractors to implement equal employment pro-
grams. Exec. Order No. 8802, 3 C.F.R. 957 (Supp. 1938-43). President Kennedy enforced
such orders in 1961, by requiring termination of contracts for those who did not comply.
Exec. Order No. 10925, 3 C.F.R. 448 (Supp. 1959-63). The present order charges the
Secretary of Labor with administration, and contractors must use affirmative action to en-
sure that equal employment opportunity is provided. Exec. Order No. 11246, 3 C.F.R. 339
(Supp. 1965). Authority for such orders has been sustained in a number of cases and
opinions. See Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971); 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN. No. 21 (1961). For discussion of the contract compliance pro-
gram, see U.S. CoMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFroRT-1974, VOL. V: To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION (1975).
Another example of a federal affirmative action program is the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) (Title VI), which forbids discrimination in programs re-
ceiving Federal assistance. The power to grant or withhold tax exemptions has also been
used by the federal government to induce affirmative action. Green v. Connally, 330 F.
Supp. 1150 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971). See Proposed
Rev. Proc., 50 Fed. Reg. 6991 (1975); Rev. Rul. 231, 1975-1 C.B. 158; Rev. Rul. 447,
1971-2 C.B. 330.
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1. Employment Cases
The validity of federal programs that merely eliminate "built-
in headwinds" to minority employment has been fairly well
established. 281 Where programs operate to actually transfer scarce
places from one group to another, however, far more difficult
issues are presented. There is a significant difference between
eliminating headwinds which have unfair detrimental effects, and
creating tailwinds which cause unfair racial preferment. Never-
theless, the Supreme Court, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation
Co. ,282 expansively construed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964283 to authorize retroactive grants of competitive-type senior-
ity, even though such an award can adversely affect innocent fellow
employees not parties to the discrimination. The Court justified
the ruling under the "make whole" objective of the Act.284 To
Justice Powell this was a discriminatory interpretation of the Act,
because such awards "directly implicate the rights and expectations
of perfectly innocent employees. ' 28 5 Chief Justice Burger de-
scribed the result as " 'robbing Peter to pay Paul.' "1286 Significantly,
neither the Chief Justice nor Justice Powell objected to the general
principle of compensatory relief; rather they called for an equita-
281 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). Griggs involved an action
brought under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17
(Supp. V 1975)). The Court held that once differential racial impact is shown, the chal-
lenged practice is prohibited unless the employer can prove that the practice has "a de-
monstrable relationship to successful performance of the jobs for which it [is] used." 401
U.S. at 431.
282 424 U.S. 747 (1976). The Fifth Circuit had held that retroactive seniority relief for
non-employee plaintiffs was barred by the terms of the Act itself. 495 F.2d 398, 417-18
(5th Cir. 1974). See also Meadows v. Ford Motor Co., 510 F.2d 939, 949 (6th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 2215 (1976).
283 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
284 424 U.S. at 763-69.
285 Id. at 788 (concurring and dissenting opinion). Justice Rehnquistjoined this opinion.
Noting the view of some commentators that the "expectations" of incumbent workers
might not be legitimate where they resulted from past discrimination against others, Justice
Powell, in language reminiscent of his concern for the burden on innocent children in
school desegregation (Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 249-50), had this response:
Absent some showing of collusion, the incumbent employee was not a party to the
discrimination by the employer. Acceptance of the job when offered hardly makes
one an accessory to a discriminatory failure to hire someone else. Moreover, the
incumbent's expectancy does not result from discrimination against others, but is
based on his own efforts and satisfactory performance.
424 U.S. at 788-89 n.7.28 6 Id. at 781 (concurring and dissenting opinion). Three months later a federal district
court upheld the reverse discrimination promotion of a woman over a man who was more
qualified on the basis of a rating scale, but ruled that the man was entitled to money
damages from the employer for lost pay and loss of position regarding further promo-
tions. McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976).
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ble "balancing" process, case by case, in which the "claims of dis-
crimination victims" would be weighed against the "economic
penalties that would be imposed on innocent incumbent
employees. 28 1
When "affirmative action" programs extend beyond encour-
agement of nondiscriminatory hiring programs28 8 among persons
of presumptively equal capability, 289 and beyond nullification of
nonvalidated entry tests, 290 and begin to produce actual discrimina-
tion against particular nonminority persons (as alleged in Bowman),
a significant constitutional issue arises.291 Yet the Supreme Court
has handled Title VII cases solely in terms of statutory construc-
tion, without addressing the constitutional questions raised by ra-
cial preferences. This cannot last. Preferential hiring (or retention)
on a nominally "temporary" remedial basis292 is approaching the
point where school desegregation has already arrived: the point
where the breadth of a "remedy" untested by constitutional con-
cepts subtly expands the substantive right.
Another alleged employment discrimination case in mid-1976,
Washington v. Davis,293 did result in a significant constitutional rul-
287 424 U.S. at 794 (concurring and dissenting opinion, Powell, J.). See Edwards, Race
Discrimination in Employment: What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572. Both in school
desegregation and employment discrimination cases, the urgent conceptual question in-
volves not the initial discriminatory act, but the subsequent use of class-conscious remedial
devices. See also Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648, 656 (2d Cir. 1976); Patterson v. American
Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 268-69, 273-74 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 314 (1976).
288 See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.
1971) (the "Philadelphia Plan" case; concerning executive order requiring government con-
tractors to take affirmative action to increase hiring of minority employees and to avoid
discriminatory practices during employment).
289 As has been pointed out, it "would be difficult to rationalize the granting of prefer-
ences if a company were able to show that all qualified applicants were not equal, that
some were clearly better than others." Edwards, supra note 287, at 598.
291 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
291 In the "Philadelphia Plan" case, Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor,
442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1971), the court of appeals rejected an equal protection argument
that the Plan really involved racial quotas, concluding simply that the action was designed
to "remedy the perceived evil that minority tradesmen have not been included in the labor
pool." Id. at 177.
2'2 The "trigger" for such temporary remedial action may be either a violation of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act (see, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)),
or a violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, as in NAACP v.
Allen, 493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974). The extensive remedial decree recently issued on Title
VII grounds against the Western Electric company by a federal district court in Virginia
illustrates this point. The court awarded full backpay to a class of black and female em-
ployees from 1965 through most of 1976, and continuous future payment to class mem-
bers if lack of vacancies precluded actual placement in higher rated positions. See THE
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER LAW, COMMITTEE REPORT No. 23, Oct.
1976, at 8.
293 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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ing, although not on the preference question per se. The suit in
Washington was brought not under a fair employment statute, but
under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment.
The Court held that a showing of disproportionate racial impact
adverse to blacks under facially neutral public employment tests
was insufficient to establish a prima facie case of constitutional
violation, where there was no proof of discriminatory governmen-
tal purpose. 294 At issue was the United States Civil Service
Commission's widely used functional literacy test, challenged be-
cause four times as many black applicants for the District of Co-
lumbia police force failed it as did whites. In upholding the test,
the Court rejected the concept of automatically requiring a show-
ing of job-relatedness of tests whenever disproportionate racial im-
pact is shown.295 The Court viewed such a simple prima facie ap-
proach as a new form of equal protection strict scrutiny, operating
to shift a quick and heavy burden of proof to the government. It
said the approach would invalidate many laws and regulations
which, though neutral in purpose and phrasing, impact more heav-
ily on blacks or the poor generally (e.g., the regressive sales tax).296
In requiring proof of discriminatory purpose,297 not just dis-
proportionate impact,298  Washington seems to undergird the
school desegregation cases such as Keyes v. School District No. 1299
and Milliken v. Bradley,300 which held that a showing of state in-
294 Id. at 243-45. The Court thus contradicted the ruling in Griggs, but that case, the
Court explained, rested on Title VII statutory grounds, not on a principle of constitutional
law. Id. at 236-39.295 Id. at 243-45. Washington thus struck down a rule that had been applied in almost
all federal judicial circuits since 1972. See cases cited id. at 244 n.12.296 Id. at 248. In rejecting a broad prima facie rule as a matter of constitutional law,
the Court seemed to leave open the possibility that such a rule might be permissible as a
statutory requirement in certain areas, as it presently is in the area of public employment.
Id.
297 The Court went all the way back to Strauder v. West Va., 100 U.S. 303 (1879), and
traced from there the principle that a showing of official discriminatory purpose is central
to an equal protection claim. 426 U.S. at 239-41. Contrary language in some cases, stress-
ing racial impact, was treated as unnecessary dicta. Id. at 242-43, citing Wright v. Council of
Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971).
298 In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens perceptively noted that the burden of
proving a prima facie case will vary in different contexts and that "the line between dis-
criminatory purpose and discriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and perhaps not
quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion might assume." 426 U.S. at 254. In
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), how-
ever, a decision in which Justice Stevens did not take part, the Court did clarify the distinc-
tion somewhat, supplying several factors to be considered in determining racially dis-
criminatory intent. See note 303 infra.
299 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973).
300 418 U.S. 717, 748 (1974). See also Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct.
2697 (1976), where, in reversing the lower courts, the Court noted the absence of any
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volvement was essential to prove a constitutional violation.
Washington thus necessarily reinforces the Brown-based concept of
distinguishing "de jure," and hence judicially-remediable, from "de
facto," and hence not judicially-remediable, school segregation. By
extrapolation, it can by hypothesized that the Washington decision
offers little encouragement for suits challenging the constitutional-
ity of various artisan or professional examinations, on facts show-
ing only that more blacks fail than whites. 311 Such a hypothesis is
supported by the Court's recent holding in Village of Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. ,3°2 requiring proof
of racially discriminatory intent-rather than merely a racially dis-
proportionate result-in a case of alleged discriminatory zoning.303
Despite its decision in Washington, the Court seemingly left
untouched the practice of allowing proof of disproportionate racial
impact to trigger integrative remedies in cases based on Title VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.30 4 Can two different approaches to
the "prima facie" test continue to coexist, when the factual settings
are so similar? Even with a spirit of deference to Congress, which
the Court mentioned but did not explain,'30  how long can the left
"showing... that those post-1971 changes in the racial mix.. . which were focused upon
by the lower courts were in any manner caused by segregative actions chargeable to the
defendants." Id. at 2704.
301 The Fifth Circuit has already rejected one such suit for lack of proof of intentional
discrimination. Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1093 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940
(1976). Compare Anthony v. Massachusetts, 415 F. Supp. 485 (D. Mass. 1976) (invalidating
requirement that all veterans who passed civil service examination be hired before non-
veterans), with Branch v. Du Bois, 418 F. Supp. 1128 (N.D. Ill. 1976) (Illinois statute grant-
ing preference points to veterans in civil service examination scores held constitutional
absent a showing of intent to discriminate against non-veterans).
302 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977).
303 Expanding on its holding in Washington, the Court suggested several factors which
courts could consider in determining whether a racially discriminatory intent existed, in-
cluding: evidence of disproportionate racial impact; historical background of the chal-
lenged action; specific antecedent events; departures from normal procedures; and con-
temporary statements of those involved in the decisionmaking. Id. at 564-65.
304 The parties had litigated Washington on the mistaken assumption that the simple
"prima facie" approach to proving employment discrimination, developed in Title VII
cases, was applicable also to cases based on the equal protection component of the due
process clause. 426 U.S. at 236-37 n.6. Today a suit such as Washington could be grounded
directly on Title VII, which was made applicable to public employees by a 1972 amend-
ment (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975)). 426 U.S. at 238 n.10.
In the Arlington Heights case, the Court remanded a fair housing claim based on Title
VIII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, as well as the constitutional challenge to the local zoning
ordinance. 97 S. Ct. at 566. While directing the court of appeals to require a show-
ing of discriminatory intent as to the constitutional claim, the Court did not suggest a
proper test for the Title VIII claim. The case thus leaves open the question of whether less
stringent standards of proof will be required to show a Civil Rights Act violation than a
constitutional violation.
30' See note 296 supra.
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hand of statutory affirmative action be kept separate from the
right hand of constitutionalism? The answer may lie not in the
employment cases, but in the higher education cases.
2. Higher Education Cases
Is it constitutional to reserve some places in higher education
for minority group applicants by applying lower academic stan-
dards than those regularly applied, when the effect is to disadvan-
tage identifiable members of the majority group? This question is
troublesome on several counts: the theoretical justification for the
preference; the "minorities" to be included, and sub-quotas or
ranking within the "minorities"; the degree of the preference; and
the duration of the preference. The last point is especially critical
because here there is no clear "termination date" analogous to that
in the school desegregation cases, where the dismantling of an
officially segregated system can be accomplished in a finite time
period.30 6
The Supreme Court avoided the issue in the famous case of De
Funis v. Odegaard,30 7 involving preferential admissions at the Uni-
versity of Washington Law School. It found "mootness" on the
ground that plaintiff De Funis, who had been admitted pending
appeal by lower court order, was about to graduate .3 18 Justice
Douglas dissented from the mootness conclusion 31 9 and wrote an
ambivalent opinion on the merits, renewing his opposition to racial
registers310 and espousing the concept of a color-blind Constitu-
tion. Nevertheless, faced with the reality of the black experience,
he strained to find a constitutionally inoffensive way to permit
some black preference in law school admissions. He suggested
supplementing the conventional academic admissions criteria with
indicators taking into account socio-economic class factors, in order
30 See Pasadena Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 96 S. Ct. 2697 (1976).
30.7 416 U.S. 312 (1974). See generally Posner, supra note 16, at 7-32; De Funis Symposium,
75 COLUM. L. REv. 483 (1975); De Funis: The Road Not Taken, 60 VA. L. REv. 917 (1974).
3'8 The Washington Supreme Court had reversed the trial court order directing De
Funis' admission, but Justice Douglas stayed that reversal pending review of the case in the
Supreme Court. By the time the 28 briefs were filed, De Funis was beginning his final
year. The University told the Court that De Funis would be allowed to complete the year
regardless of the outcome of the case. 416 U.S. at 314-16.
3 09 Id. at 320. Justice Brennan also dissented from the mootness dismissal but did not
join Justice Douglas' discussion of the merits. Id. at 348.
310 See also Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52 (1964), a case involving alleged racial
gerrymandering, where Justice Douglas said that "in a society that honors the Lincoln
tradition" grouping by race has no place. Id. at 66. In De Funis, he said that the "Equal
Protection Clause commands the elimination of racial barriers, not their creation in order
to satisfy our theory as to how society ought to be organized." 416 U.S. at 342.
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to reach the "disadvantaged" generally.311
More recently, the New York Court of Appeals also managed
to avoid a conclusive ruling on racial preferences in a medical
school admissions case, Alevy v. Downstate Medical Center.312 The
court relied on the fact that the plaintiff had not shown that he
would have been admitted even in the absence of a race preference
policy.313 Much of the court's opinion was devoted to a quest for
the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied under the equal
protection clause in a race preference case. By rejecting strict
scrutiny and opting for a middle level review,31 4 the court was able
to offer the dictum that race preference might be a permissible
legislative experiment in narrowly limited circumstances. But its list
of arguments against reverse discrimination was longer than its list
of justifications : 31 5
[O]ur recognition that benign discrimination is permissible
should not be taken as tacit approval of such practices. We reit-
erate that preferential policies, laudable in origin and goal, may
be laden with substantial detrimental side effects which make
their use undesirable. If such practices really work, the period
and extent of their use should be temporary and limited for as
goals are achieved, their utilization should be diminished.31 6
In a similar medical school admissions case, Bakke v. Regents of
the University of California,317 the Supreme Court of California did
reach the merits, even though it was not clear that the plaintiff
311 416 U.S. at 340-41.
312 39 N.Y.2d 326, 348 N.E.2d 537, 384 N.Y.S.2d 82 (1976).
3
'
3 1d. at 338, 348 N.E.2d at 547, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91-92. The plaintiff's academic
credentials, although better than those of the students admitted under the preference
program, did not place him high enough on the list of other nonminority candidates to
ensure his admission even if the minority places were opened to competition. However, the
court noted that "petitioner's MCAT average of 680 was higher than every one of the
accepted minority students." Id. at 331, 348 N.E.2d at 542, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
314 Once the court settled on a middle level review, the upholding of reverse discrimi-
nation was assured, without requiring serious inquiry into the hard questions involved in
such a decision. This is not an uncommon danger in the Supreme Court's recent "levels of
review" scholasticism under equal protection.
312 The court said that there was nothing inherently suspect in discrimination by the
majority against itself, and that the stigma is not serious when a majority member is denied
admission. But it said that reverse discrimination was a questionable policy because it
would encourage polarization of races, perpetuate thinking in racial terms, tend to under-
mine minority incentive for self-improvement, cause those advanced by reverse discrimina-
tion to be held in lower esteem, and require extremely difficult racial determinations. 39
N.Y.2d at 335-36, 348 N.E.2d at 545, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 90.
316 Id. at 337, 348 N.E.2d at 546, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 91.
317 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), modified, 18 Cal. 3d 252b
- P.2d - , - Cal. Rptr. - , cert. granted, 45 U.S.L.W. 3555 (U.S. Feb. 22, 1977).
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would have been admitted even if there had been no minority
preference policy.31 8 In a somewhat involuted opinion, the court
invalidated the overt use of race as an admissions criterion, at least
where the preferential placement of minority group members de-
prived nonminorities "of benefits which they would otherwise
have enjoyed. '319 The spirit of the Douglas opinion in De Funis
thus came to fruition.32 0 Although rejecting race preference in
strong, even moral terms, the court said that integration was a
valid public policy objective, and that subsidies and special pro-
grams were constitutionally permissible means of increasing mi-
nority enrollment. 321
The Bakke dissent asked the troublesome question. If racial
integration is a valid purpose, why can it not be accomplished
directly by considering race at the "means" stage and overtly re-
cruiting blacks as blacks, instead of engaging in "manipulation of
labels"?322 The majority conceded that classification by race does
not always render a program unconstitutional, but it distinguished
the past instances in which racial classification had been permitted
from the preferential admission situation. In the previous cases,
the racial classification did not deprive any nonminority persons of
benefits they otherwise would have enjoyed 323 (except for tempo-
1' Although other nonminority candidates denied admission were more qualified than
Bakke, his grade point average of 3.51 and MCAT percentile scores of 96, 94, 97, and 72
placed him above all 16 of the minority candidates accepted. Some minority students who
were admitted had grade point averages below 2.5 and the mean percentage MCAT scores
of minority students admitted in 1973 and 1974 classes were below the fiftieth percentile in
all four areas tested. Id. at 43, 553 P.2d at 1158-59, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 686-87.319 Id. at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688.
12' For another case rejecting an affirmative action program in higher education on
reverse discrimination grounds, see Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F.
Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976). As in Bakke, the preferential action challenged (sex preference
in hiring to meet a supposed federally imposed affirmative action duty) was not predicated
on any finding of past discrimination needed to constitutionalize such discriminatory action
by the state.
A similar result has been reached tinder the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Flanagan v.
President & Director of Georgetown College, 417 F. Supp. 377 (D.D.C. 1976) (pro-black
discrimination in student aid invalidated under Title VI). See also Cramer v. Virginia
Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va. 1976) (Title VII as alternative ground
of decision).
321 The court mentioned such approaches as aggressive recruitment, remedial school-
ing for all races, increased enrollment, and expanded admission criteria including consid-
eration of "matters relating to the needs of the profession and society, such as an
applicant's professional goals." 18 Cal. 3d at 55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.322 Id. at 90, 553 P.2d at 1190, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 718.
'23 The court cited, inter alia, Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (requiring instruc-
tion in English for students of Chinese ancestry). 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at 1160, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 688.
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
rary deprivations imposed to remedy illegal acts of discrimina-
tion 324).
There are several values to be achieved by race preference in
admission to higher education, and facially they have substantial
appeal. In the language of conventional equal protection litigation,
it may be argued that even if race is normally a "suspect" category,
it may be used as a classification device when the purpose is to
achieve a public policy which is supported by a compelling state
interest.325 In a broad sense one can of course say that integration
is a social good. It is objective evidence that the elusive "melting
pot" has been achieved and that tensions have eased. Stated this
baldly, however, ethnic proportionalization becomes an end in it-
self, rather than an occasionally permissible device for achieving
other neutral, but "compelling," ends. Several such neutral ends
are commonly mentioned as justifying racial preferences.
One end is the need for more black lawyers to improve legal
representation for blacks. In De Funis, Justice Douglas argued that
the goal of providing "black lawyers for blacks" 32 6 was not even a
valid state purpose, let alone a compelling governmental interest
justifying racial preferences (and the California court in Bakke
agreed 327). Yet there clearly is serious imbalance between the size
of minority groups and the number of minority lawyers available to
serve them.3 8
Another factor supporting preferential admissions is the edu-
cational benefit derived by students from attending schools with
324 Reasonable men can differ on what constitutes a legally significant deprivation. With
respect to busing for school desegregation, the Bakke majority (in dictum) saw a discom-
moding effect, but not total deprivation of an education. 18 Cal. 3d at 46, 553 P.2d at
1160, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 688. But the Bakke dissenter saw a real detriment when a middle-
class white student is bused into a lower quality school, even though he still receives an
education. Id. at 73-75, 553 P.2d at 1179-80, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 707-08.
32- See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944); Karst &
Horowitz, Affirmative Action and Equal Protection, 60 VA. L. REV. 955, 965-66 (1974); O'Neil,
Racial Preference and Higher Education: The Larger Context, 60 VA. L. REV. 925, 934-39
(1974). See also Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir. 1970), where the court upheld, as
a measure to achieve a more integrated faculty, the replacement of a promotion list system
with a system in which race was the primary (but, the court argued strongly, not the only)
factor.
326 416 U.S. at 342 (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
327 18 Cal. 3d at 53, 553 P.2d at 1165, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 693. To improve service to the
minority community, the Bakke court suggested offering more medical school courses on
the needs of minorities, and specific training for general practitioners in serving the needs
of the poor. Id. at 57, 553 P.2d at 1167, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
328 Blacks constitute 12% or more of the American population, about 1.4% of the legal
profession, and 2% of the medical profession. Brief for the Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. as
Amicus Curiae at 12, Bakke v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 533 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976).
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racially and culturally diverse student bodies. 329 And in our
pluralistic multiracial society, there is also a social benefit because
the graduates of our professional schools often become societal
leaders.
When longer lists of justifications are compiled, 330 the factor
of reparations for past wrongs or discrimination looms large.33 1
The idea of reparations, like the concept of guilt by association,
does not easily find a niche in American legal theory. A person
may control his associations, but a racial reparations policy rests on
a concept of guilt by inheritance. It visits the sins of prior genera-
tions and particular forbears on members of the present genera-
tion.
The legal literature inspired by the De Funis case is revealing,
since it indicates the troubling nature of the race preference con-
cept, even for those who accept it on one ground or another.
Seldom has a mooted case set emotion in conflict with intellect
among so many learned men. Although Erwin Griswold had
signed the Association of American Law Schools brief3 32 support-
ing the position of the University of Washington, in his subsequent
De Funis essay333 he almost gave the argument away by observing
that the University did seem to have gone "overboard" in its minor-
ity admissions program. The results reached would have been
easier to defend, Griswold now argued, if the school "had limited
[preferential admissions] to perhaps ten specially selected members
of minority groups, had carefully documented each of these, had
also carefully documented the cases of non-minority applicants in
the same zone of consideration who were not admitted, and had
made reasoned comparative judgments with respect to these. 334
Agreed. But such a policy would not be workable without extreme
effort, would have little quantitative impact, and would probably
not accomplish the results achieved in race preference admissions
programs as now commonly operated. Nor would it be easy to
329 Greenawah, Judicial Scrutiny of "Benign" Racial Preference In Law School Admissions, 75
COLuM. L. REV. 559, 590 (1975); Griswold, Some Observations On The DeFunis Case, 75
COLUm. L. REV. 512, 518 (1975).
33' See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 329, at 579-99; Nickel, Preferential Policies in Hiring
and Admissions: A Jurisprudential Approach, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 534, 536-44 (1975).
33 See generally B. BITTER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973); Hughes,
Reparations for Blacks, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063 (1968).
332 Brief for the Ass'n of Am. Law Schs. as Amicus Curiae (signed by Erwin N. Gris-
wold, Soia Mentschnikoff, and Clifford C. Alloway), DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312
(1974).
333 Griswold, supra note 329, at 513.
334 Id.
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devise nominally nonracial admissions criteria in terms of various
objective characteristics of the "disadvantaged," as suggested by
Justice Douglas in De Funis,33 5 and by the California court in
Bakke. 336 A major predicate of the Douglas position was that the
universally used Law School Admission Test might be unfair to
blacks, thus yielding a basis for judicial intervention to correct out-
right discrimination. Those who have analyzed this matter with
care, however, tell us that the Law School Admission Test as a
predictor of law school grades is "about as adequate for minority
persons as for majority persons. '331
Especially questionable is the suggestion that race preference
policies should simply be allowed to operate without being sub-
jected to careful constitutional analysis. A few years ago, John Kap-
lan put the point bluntly when he said that "the necessity of con-
sidering not only the reality of governmental action, but also its
appearance, may justify the belief that in [the racial preference
area] we cannot afford complete openness and frankness on the
part of the legislature, executive or judiciary. ' 3 8 In the short run,
justifying a policy of racial preferment by calling it a diversification
process, or the product of giving special weight to nonacademic
factors, may both ease the feelings of the rejected white and avoid
inferiority feelings on the part of the accepted black. But as Kent
Greenawalt suggests, judicial honesty is the soundest policy in the
"absence of an unanswerable argument for hypocrisy. '339 Surely a
policy of evasion, concealment, and deception is not the way to
achieve the ultimate goal of interracial recognition, tolerance, and
especially, respect.
There is much the government legitimately can do in terms of
grants, programs to identify the full talent pool, and special pro-
grams to improve qualifications. It would be an extremely danger-
ous precedent, however, for a state school to impose preferential
race quotas or goals in form or in fact, if ever constitutionalized.
Recognizing this, some supporters of minority admissions pro-
grams have characterized reverse discrimination as a remedial pro-
gram, pointing out that "no one argues that preferential minority
335 416 U.S. at 340-41 (dissenting opinion, Douglas, J.).
336 18 Cal. 3d at 54-55, 553 P.2d at 1166, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 694.
13' Linn, Test Bias and the Prediction of Grades in Law School, 27 J. LEGAL EDUc. 293,
322-23 (1975). See also Hart & Evans, Major Research Efforts of the Law School Admission
Council, Apr. 1976.
13s Kaplan, Equal Justice In An Unequal World: Equality For The Negro-The Problem Of
Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363, 410 (1966).
139 Greenawalt, supra note 329, at 602. See also Karst & Horowitz, supra note 325, at
972-74.
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admissions programs of law schools are anything but temporary,
designed to last only so long as they are needed to secure inte-
grated law schools and an integrated bar. '3 40
The argument is superficially appealing and brings us back to
the "right-remedy" distinction.3 41 If an established right is violated,
remedies follow, and in extraordinary situations342 action may be
required which courts could not constitutionally order in other
situations. The crucial point is that in the area of reverse discrimi-
nation, exemplified by the De Funis-Alevy-Bakke line of cases, there
have been no power-creating and power-limiting (with respect to
duration) adjudications of legal violations on the part of the state
professional schools at issue. Instead, there is an appropriate policy
choice-a legislative choice really-to try to bring more blacks and
other minorities into the profession. But such legislative action
must be distinguished from adjudication. Legislative action against
a social wrong is not the equivalent of a judicial finding of constitu-
tional violation.
In the normal process of public policy-making, various needs
and wrongs are identified, and the responsible bodies adopt ap-
propriate policies. There is strength in the argument that courts
should not generally interfere with legislative judgments on how to
ameliorate the primary race problem-the problem of the black
minority. 343 But policy-making exists inside a constitutional system,
and the Constitution limits the means by which even urgent
policies can be achieved. Calling a rule "remedial, '344 or calling the
rule's target a social wrong, should not create legislative power to
340 Karst & Horowitz, supra note 325, at 972.
n' See notes 248-64 and accompanying text supra.
342 Examples include dismantling of a dual school system as in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (where the Court emphasized the point that,
remedy aside, there is no "substantive constitutional right!' to "any particular degree of
racial balance," id. at 24), and correcting discrimination in hiring, as in NAACP v. Allen,
493 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (where the court upheld the district court's order for a
one-to-one black-white hiring ratio until 25% of the work force was black).
"' This is the ultimate defense of reverse discrimination given in Sandalow, Racial
Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. CHI. L. REv.
653 (1975), although he recognizes the "risk" and is "uncomfortable" with it. Id. at 703.
Edwards and Zaretsky have expressed similar discomfort, stressing the transitory nature of
preferential employment remedies, and the "legal and moral questions concerning reverse
discrimination against white male workers." Edwards and Zaretsky, Preferential Remedies For
Employment Discrimination, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1, 46 (1975).
n' The "remedial theory," which justifies temporarily transcending normal constitu-
tional bounds, may be available to Congress when it acts in response to court decisions
identifying a pattern of constitutional violation by some states, as in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966), where the Court sustained the temporary federal
takeover of the setting of voting qualifications-even though the Constitution allocates to
the states the power to set voting qualifications.
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operate, even temporarily, in discriminatory, constitutionally for-
bidden ways-absent an adjudicated wrong.
To treat a statutory policy as the equivalent of an adjudicated
constitutional wrong is to give the legislature a power to circum-
vent the Constitution. Indeed, it would mean that substantive goals
can be accomplished by illegal means if the legislature uses "right-
remedy" rhetoric rather than conventional policy-making lan-
guage. The only principle that may safely be a constitutional prin-
ciple must be a simple and enduring one for all men in all seasons:
overt, official discrimination on racial grounds is not permissible as
a general legislative policy.
CONCLUSION
Writing in 1835, De Tocqueville saw the "progressive de-
velopment of social equality" as part of the sweep of history over a
700-year period.3 45 He saw the freeing of the social structure,
but not the philosophical tensions in the equality concept itself. It
can now be more clearly perceived that "equality," taken seriously,
is the most elusive value of all, with internal inconsistencies and
uncertain boundaries. It is also apparent that the equal protection
of the laws clause, the most explicit recognition of an equality prin-
ciple in our Constitution, is our most refractory constitutional
clause. Long dormant, even in its application to racial matters, the
equal protection clause has undergone a revival in recent years that
has been a constitutional law event. Today, the clause is an impor-
tant vehicle for judicial scrutiny of legislative classifications. But the
equal protection clause gives little more guidance to the judiciary
now than did the due process clause in an earlier day. Because
legislation is the result of compromise and adjustment, and all
legislative classifications are inexact, a vigorous equal protection
review may permit the judiciary to substantially inhibit the legisla-
tive process.
From equal protection, the judiciary also derives a newly as-
serted power to order the restructuring of government, as in
school desegregation and legislative reapportionment, rather than
to merely negate governmental action, as has been the traditional
pattern in constitutional law. The clause is now invoked to limit
governmental imposition of "inequalities" through such policies as
race preferences and reverse discrimination. It can be predicted
that both the new vigor and old elusiveness of the equal protection
concept will continue as we attempt to adjust individualistic and
egalitarian values in a dynamic and increasingly interdependent
society.
a A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 7 (H. Commager ed. 1946).
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